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The Triage and Treatment of 
Healthcare Institutions in Distress: 
How to Involve State Regulators in 
Healthcare Bankruptcies and 
Receiverships 
Honorable Brian P. Stern and Christopher J. Fragomeni*† 
INTRODUCTION 
As hospitals and other healthcare institutions continue to face 
a changing landscape in methods of patient care, reimbursement 
models, and employment practices, some of these institutions will 
continue to become subject to court supervised insolvency 
proceedings, including federal bankruptcy and state court 
receiverships.1  Financially distressed healthcare institutions pose 
 
  *  Brian P. Stern, Associate Justice, R.I. Superior Court; Director, 
American College of Business Law Judges; J.D., Brooklyn Law School.  Judge 
Stern’s experience prior to his superior court appointment includes:  Chief of 
Staff to Governor Donald L. Carcieri; Executive Director, R.I. Department of 
Administration; and Deputy Chief of Legal Services and Chief Securities 
Examiner, R.I. Department of Business Regulation. Christopher J. 
Fragomeni, Associate, Shechtman, Halperin, Savage, LLP; J.D., cum laude, 
Roger Williams University School of Law.  
  †  Judge Stern currently presides over Kent County’s Out-County 
Business Calendar, where he oversaw the receivership of Westerly Hospital.  
The authors are grateful to the bankruptcy judges, state court judges, 
bankruptcy and healthcare practitioners, and state regulators for their input. 
This large undertaking would not have been possible without their support 
and counsel. 
 1. See Gus Kallergis & Jean R. Robertson, The § 363 Miracle Drug?, 28 
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14, 14 (2009); Deryck A. Palmer & Michele J. Meises, 
Collision Course Between Bankruptcy and Health Care Laws: Which Will 
Ultimately Control?, 1999 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. 1, 1 (1999); Veronique A. 
Urban & Ted A. Berkowitz, Peninsula Hospital: Dissecting a Health Care 
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unique and complex public policy concerns when the goals of an 
insolvency proceeding conflict with a state’s responsibility to 
regulate the public health through state regulatory agencies.2  In 
particular, the purpose of an insolvency proceeding, which is to 
maximize a monetary recovery for creditors, may conflict with a 
state regulatory agency’s responsibility to ensure adequate and 
necessary healthcare under its certificate of need and licensing 
statutes.3  In such instances, due to a regulatory agency’s 
statutory and inherent power, the exercise of its regulatory 
authority may affect the value of the bankruptcy estate and 
ultimately the amount and timing of funds distributed to 
creditors.4  This Article explores the goals of bankruptcy, 
receivership, and state regulation, and considers how courts have 
reconciled the interests of a healthcare debtor, its creditors, and 
state regulatory authorities.  This Article submits that in the 
purview of healthcare insolvency, the early and continuous 
involvement of regulators throughout the insolvency proceeding 
will streamline the administration of the debtor’s estate in a way 
that advances the state regulator’s interests to protect the health, 
safety, and welfare of its citizens while maximizing recovery for 
the creditors.  It further suggests several ways that regulatory 
involvement can be achieved, either formally or informally. 
Part I of this Article briefly provides an overview of the 
process and goals of federal bankruptcy, state receivership 
proceedings, and state regulation of healthcare institutions.  Part 
II identifies the material conflict between the goals of insolvency 
and governmental healthcare regulation.  Part III explains the 
importance and power of state regulatory agencies and highlights 
how a regulatory authority can substantially affect an insolvency 
proceeding.  Part IV discusses several recent healthcare 
 
Business Bankruptcy, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 42, 42 (2013); Ayla Ellison, 10 
Recent Hospital Bankruptcies, Closures, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Jan. 25, 2016), 
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/10-recent-hospital-bankruptci 
es-closures-january25.html. 
 2. See In re United Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 97-1159, 1997 WL 176574, 
at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 1997) (noting that healthcare institutions should be 
treated differently in insolvency proceedings). 
 3. “State agency” refers to any agency that can affect the transfer or 
sale of a healthcare institution including: (1) a state’s department of health in 
transferring licenses and certificates of need or (2) a state’s attorney general 
in transferring or disposing of a non-profit hospital’s charitable assets.   
 4. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
114-244); In re United Healthcare, 1997 WL 176574, at *10. 
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institutions’ insolvencies and highlights the involvement, or lack 
of involvement, of state regulatory agencies and how such action 
or inaction affected the insolvency proceeding.  Last, Part V will 
make several recommendations on how state regulators can be 
involved in bankruptcy and receivership proceedings so that a 
healthcare institution may successfully navigate through 
insolvency. 
I. INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS, STATE REGULATION, AND THEIR GOALS 
In order to evaluate the coarse interplay between insolvency 
and state regulation, it is important to understand the bankruptcy 
and receivership process as well as the manner in which states 
regulate healthcare facilities.  Further, it is important to 
understand the goals and purposes of insolvency proceedings and 
state regulation and how they conflict. 
A. Bankruptcy 
1. Bankruptcy Process 
If a healthcare institution or its creditors seek to initiate a 
bankruptcy proceeding, they may do so by filing a voluntary or 
involuntary petition5 under Chapter 7, 9, or 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.6  Under a Chapter 7 proceeding, a bankruptcy court takes 
control of a debtor’s assets, liquidates them, and distributes the 
proceeds from the sale of the assets to the debtor’s creditors in a 
manner consistent with the Code.7  In return for this liquidation, 
the debtor receives a discharge of certain debts.8  However, if the 
healthcare institution is owned or controlled by a “municipality,”9 
 
 5. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–303(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–
244). 
 6. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)–(d) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244); 
ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1.07(2), at 
1–31 (16th ed. 2016) (“Chapter 9 is available only to a municipality and only 
by means of a voluntary petition.”); Ellen E. Sward, Resolving Conflicts 
Between Bankruptcy Law and the State Police Power, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 403, 
405 (1987). 
 7. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 701–784 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244); 
RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.07(1)(a), at 1–25. 
 8. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 523–524, 727(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
114–244). 
 9. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(40) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244); 
RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.07(2), at 1–31 (defining “municipality” 
broadly as “political subdivisions or public agency or instrumentality of a 
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it may seek relief under Chapter 9 of the Code, provided that it 
has specific authorization from the state.10  Under Chapter 9, the 
municipality negotiates a plan with its creditors, bondholders, and 
note holders that enables the municipality to adjust its debt and 
continue operations.11  If a healthcare institution petitions for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Code, its debt is reorganized 
in a manner in which the debtor can pay the sum of its creditors’ 
approved claims with its future earnings.12  Reorganization is a 
“negotiating process, and Chapter [11] provides the milieu for 
such negotiation . . . . It [] provides . . . a balancing [] tool [] and 
leverage among the parties involved in the process to foster 
negotiation and bargaining.”13 
The most important effect of a bankruptcy filing—either  
under Chapter 7, 9, or 11—is the imposition of an automatic stay 
on any collection actions or claims against the debtor.14  The 
automatic stay serves as, 
one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the 
bankruptcy laws.  It gives the debtor a breathing spell 
from his creditors.  It stops all collection efforts, all 
harassment, and all foreclosure actions.  It permits the 
debtor to attempt to [formulate a liquidation plan,] 
reorganization plan, [plan of adjustment,] or simply to be 
relieved of the financial pressures that drove [it] into 
bankruptcy.15 
 
state,” including “cities, towns, and counties”). 
 10. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(c)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244); 
RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.07(2), at 1–31 (Chapter 9 is the only 
type of bankruptcy available to a municipality.).  Such limitation is premised 
upon the separation of federal and state government: 
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution limits the power of 
Congress to prescribe for the state or any portion of a state and 
Chapter 9 reflects this limitation.  For example, should a city file a 
Chapter 9 petition, the bankruptcy judge may not take over the 
governance of the city, appoint a trustee or otherwise interfere with 
the affairs of the city.  
Id.   
 11. RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.07(2), at 1–31. 
 12. Id.; see Sward, supra note 6, at 405.   
 13. RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.07(3), at 1–31. 
 14. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).  
Importantly, as discussed infra, Part III, the automatic stay does not apply to 
state regulatory actions. 
 15. H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, pt. 1, at 340 (1977). 
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The purpose of the automatic stay is to prevent a creditor 
remedying its claims against the debtor to the detriment of other 
creditors.16  Without the automatic stay, creditors would be in a 
“race to the courthouse” to ensure a collection of their debts.17  
Rather, the automatic stay provides a bankruptcy court and 
creditors the opportunity for an orderly liquidation and an 
equitable distribution of the debtor’s assets according to the 
priority of the creditors’ claims and rights under the Code.18  
Specifically, the automatic stay prevents a debtor’s creditors from 
commencing or continuing a lawsuit; enforcing a judgment; 
controlling any property of the bankruptcy estate; creating, 
perfecting, or enforcing a lien; collecting debts; or exercising any 
rights of setoff against the debtor.19  While broad in its scope, the 
automatic stay has several exceptions, one of which, as discussed 
infra, specifically exempts state regulatory actions against the 
debtor. 
2. Bankruptcy Goals 
While the goals of the Code vary and are far reaching, the two 
main fundamental purposes of bankruptcy are (1) “either to 
rehabilitate financially a distressed debtor or to assemble and 
liquidate his assets for distribution to creditors,”20 and (2) “to give 
the [debtor] a fresh start.”21  In achieving either goal, “the nature 
of bankruptcy is to sort out all of the debtor’s legal relationships 
with others, and to apply the principles and rules of the 
 
 16. See HON. NANCY C. DREHER & HON. JOAN N. FEENEY, BANKRUPTCY 
LAW MANUAL § 2:1, at 2 (5th ed. 2008). 
 17. See In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 B.R. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah 
1981). “The automatic stay . . . is designed ‘to prevent a chaotic and 
uncontrolled scramble for the debtor’s [assets] in a variety of uncoordinated 
proceedings in different courts.’” Id. (quoting Fid. Mortg. Inv’rs v. Camelia 
Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976)).  “Such procedural safeguard 
‘shields creditors from one another by replacing ‘race’ and other preferential 
systems of debt collection with a more equitable and orderly distribution of 
assets.’” Id. 
 18. DREHER & FEENEY, supra note 16, § 2:1, at 2. 
 19. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(1–7) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–
244). 
 20. H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, pt. 1, at 10 (1977); see In re Saint Vincents 
Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., 429 B.R. 139, 146 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“One 
of the Bankruptcy Code’s main purposes . . . ‘is to convert the bankrupt’s 
estate . . . and distribute it among creditors.’”). 
 21. Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913); see also RESNICK & 
SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.01(1), at 1–4. 
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bankruptcy laws to those relationships.”22 
The first fundamental goal of bankruptcy—to either 
reorganize debts or liquidate assets for the benefit of creditors—is  
advantageous because it “‘secure[s] a prompt and effectual 
administration and settlement of the estate of all bankrupts 
within a limited period.’”23  However, in a Chapter 7 liquidation of 
assets, the distribution of the proceeds may not be done in an 
equal way; a creditor’s priorities determine the amount of their 
claim they will recover and whether they will receive that money 
before or after other creditors.24  This hierarchical structure 
“protects the rights of senior creditors against dilution either by 
junior creditors or equity interests.”25 
Furthermore, the second goal of bankruptcy—to give a debtor 
a fresh start—“gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a 
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, 
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting 
debt.”26  Thus, “[t]he essence of [bankruptcy] is to provide a 
mechanism for the reorganization of a financially distressed 
business . . . in the hope that a profitable and productive member 
of its economic community can one again emerge.”27 
B. Receivership 
1. Receivership Proceedings 
While there are many different types of receivership 
proceedings,28 this Article will focus on state receivership in the 
 
 22. H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, pt. 1, at 10 (1977). 
 23. RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.01(1) at 1–4 (quoting Katchen 
v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966)). 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. at § 1.01(1) at 1–5 (quoting Marine Harbor Props. v. Mfrs. Tr. Co., 
317 U.S. 78, 87 (1942)). 
 26. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citation omitted).  
This goal can be accomplished through Chapter 7 discharge of debts or a 
restructure of debts under Chapter 11 into a practicable and feasible future 
repayment plan.  RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.01(1), at 1–4.  It can 
further be achieved by the Code’s allowance of debtors to withdraw assets 
from the bankruptcy estate up to a certain value.  See 11 U.S.C.A. §   
522(b)(1)–(2), (d) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). 
 27. RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.07(3)(a), at 1–31 (alteration in 
original). 
 28. See 65 AM. JUR. 2D Receivers §§ 2, 3 (2011); see also WILLIAM MEADE 
FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, § 7708, at 
168–69 (perm. ed., rev. 2015). 
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purview of insolvency.  Due to its equitable nature, receivership 
serves as a practical, flexible, and more adaptable alternative to 
bankruptcy.29  As an equitable remedy, receivership proceedings 
can “be tailored to the circumstances of the case to a much finer 
degree than a bankruptcy.”30  For instance, in receivership, a 
court has the ability to set out procedures, rules, or any other 
mechanisms that are appropriate to the specific insolvency.31  
Parties to a receivership proceeding may benefit from it because, 
assets are sold or disposed of more quickly, and the 
secured lender’s collateral is more quickly adjudicated, [] 
notification of creditors is simplified, [] the lender has 
greater control over the disposition of assets and 
management of the case since the lender compensates the 
receiver, [] distributions to secured creditors generally 
proceed faster since subordinate classes of creditors 
typically receive no distribution, [] the lender is shielded 
from liability to third parties for negligence from 
possession, and [] the time required to eject a borrower is 
shortened under a receivership versus a foreclosure 
action.32 
Generally, the grounds for appointment of a receiver are 
designated by statute,33 and one of those grounds is typically the 
dissolution or liquidation of a distressed business.34  As mentioned 
above, a receiver may also be appointed in equity.35  In addition, 
similar to a bankruptcy petition, a receivership proceeding may be 
initiated voluntarily (by the debtor) or involuntarily (by the 
 
 29. John M. Tanner, Equitable Receivership as an Alternative to 
Bankruptcy, 40 COLO. LAW 41, 46 (2011). “An equitable receivership may 
provide better relief for investors in or creditors of a troubled company than a 
bankruptcy reorganization.  Receiverships immediately replace management, 
are more flexible, and can be more closely tailored to the situation.”  Id. at 41.  
“Generally speaking, receivership proceedings are less formalistic and less 
structured than federal bankruptcy proceedings.” Allan M. Shine, 
Receiverships Survive Pre- Emption Attack, 47 R.I. B.J., Mar. 1999, at 11. 
 30. Tanner, supra note 29, at 41. 
 31. See id.   
 32. Shine, supra note 29, at 11 (citation omitted). 
 33. See FLETCHER, supra note 28, § 7709, at 171; see also DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 291 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32.010 (West, Westlaw through 
2015 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6401 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2016 
Reg. Sess.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-1316 (2016). 
 34. See Receivers, supra note 28, § 36.   
 35. Tanner, supra note 29, at 41. 
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creditors).36  If a petition for receivership is approved, the court 
then appoints a receiver, who takes control of the debtor’s 
assets.37  By definition, a receiver is “an officer of the court to 
receive, collect, care for, administer, and dispose of the property or 
the fruits of the property of another or others brought under the 
orders of court by the institution of a proper action or actions.”38  
More simply, a receiver is an indifferent, disinterested officer of 
the court, who is subject to the court’s direction and orders, and 
who possesses and controls property for the court while ensuring 
redress and repayment of creditors’ claims against the debtor.39 
As a receivership proceeding sounds in equity, a court has 
broad powers to prevent interference in administrating the estate 
by issuing a stay order, similar to the automatic stay in 
bankruptcy proceedings.40  A stay is typically issued in the order 
appointing a receiver and freezes the assets of the debtor, 
preventing the sale, attachment, garnishment, or levy of any lien 
against any property in the receivership estate.41  The purpose of 
a receivership stay is similar to the bankruptcy stay: “a receiver 
must be given a chance to do the important job of marshaling and 
untangling a company’s assets without being forced into court by 
every investor or claimant.”42  However, a court, in its discretion, 
may grant a creditor relief from the stay in order for the creditor 
to exercise its rights over property in the receivership estate.43 
2. Receivership Goals 
Originally, receivership served as an equitable remedy for 
 
 36. See Receivers, supra note 28, §§ 11, 12.   
 37. See FLETCHER, supra note 28, § 7665, at 15–16. 
 38. RALPH E. CLARK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF RECEIVERS 
§ 11, at 13 (3d ed. 1992) (citation omitted).  While there are many types of 
receivers, this Article will focus on the court-appointed receiver.  See id. § 11, 
at 13–15.   
 39. See id. § 35(a), at 37.   
 40. See Receivers, supra note 28, §§ 120, 400. 
 41. See CLARK, supra note 38, § 47, at 50; Receivers, supra note 28, § 124. 
A violation of the stay will void the conveyance and is grounds for contempt of 
court.  Id. §§ 125, 129. 
 42. United States v. Acorn Tech. Fund, L.P., 429 F.3d 438, 443 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
 43. See id. (“Nevertheless, an appropriate escape valve, which allows 
potential litigants to petition the court for permission to sue, is necessary so 
that litigants are not denied a day in court during a lengthy stay.”); see also 
Receivers, supra note 28, § 125.   
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creditors.44  The fundamental purpose of any receivership action 
is to bring property under the control of the court so that it may be 
held pending litigation and possibly disposed of in order to satisfy 
judgments.45 Concerning a liquidating receivership, however, 
there is generally one goal: “the maximizing of the value of the 
assets for the benefit of the creditors,”46 which can be done either 
through the sale of the entity as a going concern, or a liquidation 
of the company’s assets. 
C. State Regulation of Healthcare Entities 
1. State Power to Regulate 
All states bear the ability to exert “police powers” over their 
citizens, which have broadly been defined as the “power of 
governing, possessed by the States but not by the Federal 
Government . . . .”47  The United States Supreme Court has 
explained that “[b]ecause the police power is controlled by 50 
different States instead of one national sovereign, the facets of 
governing that touch on citizens’ daily lives are normally 
administered by smaller governments closer to the governed.”48  
Such traditional police power is properly exerted by a state when 
it regulates its citizens’ health, safety, and general welfare.49 
Additionally, “[a] state’s police power with regard to 
protection of the health, morals, and welfare of the public 
includes, by implication, the right to regulate by requiring a 
license as a prerequisite to the carrying on of certain activities, 
commonly designated as businesses, occupations, professions, 
vocations, trades, or callings.”50  Most relevant and specific to the 
 
 44. Diane Finkle, Attorney Practice Guide: Creditors’ and Debtors’ Rights, 
56 R.I. B.J. Mar.–Apr. 2008, at 9, 10 (citing CLARK, supra note 38, § 4, at 4); 
see FLETCHER, supra note 28, § 7812.50, at 16. 
 45. See CLARK, supra note 38, § 47, at 51; see also Receivers, supra note 
28, § 181.  “The court holds and administers the estate through receivership 
as its officer for the benefit of those whom the court will ultimately adjudge to 
be entitled to it.”  FLETCHER, supra note 28, § 7810, at 448 (citation omitted).   
 46. Fleet Nat’l Bank v. H & D Entm’t, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 226, 244 (D. 
Mass.), aff’d, 96 F.3d 532 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 47. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) 
(citation omitted).   
 48. Id.   
 49. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 300 (2006) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 50. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Licenses and Permits § 9 (2011) (citing Great Atl. & 
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topic of this Article, “[i]t is elementary that the promotion and 
protection of the public health is a proper subject for exercise of 
the police power of the State and, obviously, [healthcare 
institutions], whether publicly or privately owned, are operated 
for that purpose and subject to State regulation.”51  Generally, 
there are three instances in which states regulate a healthcare 
institution: (1) at its inception; (2) during its operation; and (3) 
during the transfer of its licenses, certificate of need, ownership, 
or the healthcare facility’s closure.52 
At a healthcare institution’s inception, the majority of states 
require that healthcare institutions satisfy the state’s certificate-
of-need statute before providing any healthcare service within the 
state.53  A certificate of need “requires a facility to obtain the 
 
Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937)). 
 51. Foster v. N. Carolina Med. Care Comm’n, 195 S.E.2d 517, 528 (N.C. 
1973) (alteration in original). 
 52. See 41 C.J.S. Hospitals §§ 6, 9 (Westlaw 2016). 
 53. Currently, almost every state requires a healthcare institution to 
obtain a certificate of need before operating.  See ALA. CODE § 22-21-266 
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); ALASKA STAT. § 18.07.031 (2016); 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 127245 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. 
Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-638 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. 
Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9304 (West, Westlaw through 80 Laws 2016) 
(effective Dec. 31, 2020); D.C. Code § 44-406 (2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
408.041 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-6-40 
(2016); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 323D-49 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Sec. 
Spec. Sess.); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3960/5 (West, Westlaw through 2016 
Reg. Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135.63 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. 
Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.061 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. 
Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2116 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Extr. Sess.); 
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 329 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 197.315 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 50-5-301 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 71-5829.03 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 439A.100 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 151:5-a (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-7 (West, Westlaw through 
2016 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2802 (McKinney, Westlaw through 
2016 Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-178 (2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3702.52 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 
1-851.3 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
442.315 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 448.603 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); 23 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 23-15-4 (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-160 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
68-11-1607 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9434 (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 
32.1-102.3 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.38.115 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2D-8 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
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state’s approval prior to purchasing major medical equipment, 
changing institutional health services, or making a capital 
expenditure.”54  By its inherent nature, an application for a 
certificate of need will only be granted if there is a genuine need 
for the proposed healthcare facility.55  While they vary from state 
to state, typically, the determination of a certificate of need is 
decided by statutory factors.56  If statutory factors are not 
applicable, the regulating agency will review “the number of 
persons in each region who will need [the] services, and the 
resources needed to provide those services, which are then 
compared to existing resources to determine whether additional 
services are needed.”57 
During a healthcare institution’s operation, it is subject to 
state regulation over its day-to-day operations.58  For instance, 
there are sanitary, labor, and insurance regulations imposed by 
states to assure that healthcare institutions are operating in 
accordance with business practices deemed a necessity by the 
state and to guarantee adequate healthcare treatment.59 
Healthcare institutions, specifically hospitals, are subject to 
licensing requirements in addition to certificate of need 
requirements.60  Once a healthcare’s certificate of need is 
approved, it must also make application for a license to operate a 
 
 54. Palmer & Meises, supra note 1, at 5. 
 55. 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 10 (Westlaw 2016).   
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.   
 58. See Desai v. St. Barnabas Med. Ctr., 510 A.2d 662, 667–68 (N.J. 
1986). 
 59. See id. This Article will not address this instance of regulation during 
an insolvency proceeding by states, as it has already been addressed by the 
Code.  See 11 U.S.C.A. § 333 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244).  If a 
healthcare institution enters bankruptcy, a 2005 amendment to the Code 
permits a bankruptcy court to order the appointment of a patient care 
ombudsman “to monitor the quality of patient care and to represent the 
interests of the patients of the health care business.” Id.  Based on this 
amendment, it is likely that receivership proceedings would also appoint such 
an ombudsman to assure adequate patient treatment.  Accordingly, the law 
in this instance of state regulation seems to be well settled, and this Article 
will only focus on state regulation during the subsequent sale of healthcare 
institutions that have entered insolvency proceedings.   
 60. 40A AM. JUR. 2D Hospitals and Asylums § 5 (2008) (“The operation of 
an institution for the shelter, feeding, and care of sick, aged, or infirm 
persons bears a reasonable relation to the health, safety, and welfare of the 
community, and is thus subject to licensing and regulation by the state as a 
valid exercise of the police power.”). 
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healthcare institution.61  If a license is approved, it may be 
 
 61. Id.  All states, except Ohio and the District of Columbia have 
licensing requirements for hospitals.  See ALA. CODE § 22-21-22 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); ALASKA STAT. § 47.32.020 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-430 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-213 (West, Westlaw through 
2016 Sec. Extr. Sess.); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 70103 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Register); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3-101 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19A-491 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Spec. Sess.) (effective Oct. 1, 2015 to Sept. 30, 2016); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 16, § 1003 (West, Westlaw through 80 Laws 2016); D.C. CODE ANN. § 
44-502 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); FLA. STAT. § 395.003 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-3 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-14.5 (West, Westlaw through 
2016 Sec. Spec. Sess.); IDAHO CODE § 39-1303 (West, Westlaw through 2016 
Reg. Sess.); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/4 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. 
Sess.); IND. CODE § 16-21-2-10 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 135B.3 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 65-427 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 216B.105 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. § 
40:2103 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 1811 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-
318 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 51 
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.21511 
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. § 144.50 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-9-7 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); MO. REV. STAT. § 197.040 (West, Westlaw through 
2016 Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-5-201 (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Reg. Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-432 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. 
Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.030 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:2 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) 
(effective June 30, 2016); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 8:43G-2.2 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 amendments); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-5 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805 (McKinney, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-77 (West, Westlaw through 
2016 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-01 (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-702 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. 
Sess.) (effective through Sept. 1, 2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 441.015 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 448.806 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-4 (2016); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 44-7-260 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12-2 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Sess. Laws); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 68-11-204 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.021 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-21-8 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Third Spec. 
Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1903 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Spec. 
Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-125 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.41.090 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) 
(effective June 28, 2016); W. VA. CODE § 16-5B-2 (West, Westlaw through 2016 
Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. § 50.35 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 392); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 35-2-902 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Budget Sess.). 
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revoked for certain causes enumerated by statute, typically having 
to do with gross negligence or abusive or reckless conduct.62 
In the event that a healthcare institution changes ownership, 
generally, neither a certificate of need nor a license can be 
transferred or assigned.63  Therefore, a healthcare institution’s 
most valuable asset—its licenses to operate—cannot be “acquired” 
as part of a transfer in ownership.64  Instead, a change in 
ownership will require the application for a new set of licenses and 
certificate of need.65  Thus, a purchasing organization must obtain 
a license and certificate of need through a purchaser’s application 
for licensure.66  Further, in addition to application for approval of 
a certificate of need and other licenses, many states require that 
the purchaser also seek approval from the state under “conversion 
laws,” which regulate the conversion of hospitals.67 
2. Goals of State Regulation 
While state regulation of a healthcare facility has numerous 
purposes and goals, there are several goals specific to certificates 
of need and other licensing demands.  The primary purpose of 
certificate of need statutes “is to ensure that the citizens of the 
state will receive necessary and adequate institutional health 
services in an economical manner.”68 “Included among the 
 
 62. Hospitals and Asylums, supra note 60, §5. 
 63. Palmer & Meises, supra note 1, at 5; see, e.g., 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
85/4 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-29-2-7 
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.11 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-A 
(McKinney, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3702.523 (West, Westlaw through through File 124 of the 131st General 
Assembly 2015–2016); 3 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-5-19 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-
11-1620 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-2-902 
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Budget Sess.). 
 64. Palmer & Meises, supra note 1, at 5. 
 65. Id.   
 66. Id.   
 67. Samuel R. Maizel & Mary D. Lane, The Sale of Nonprofit Hospitals 
Through Bankruptcy: What BAPCPA Wrought, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 74 
(2011); see e.g., 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-5 (2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
19a-486c (West, Westlaw through 2016 Spec. Sess.) (effective Oct. 1, 2015 to 
Sept. 30, 2016); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-20,104 (West, Westlaw through 
2016 Reg. Sess.). 
 68. Hospitals and Asylums, supra note 60, § 6; 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 9 
(Westlaw 2016).  
The essence of American certificate-of-need legislation, in general . . . 
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legitimate purposes for a certificate of need statute is ensuring 
geographically convenient access to healthcare for state 
residents . . . .”69 Certificates of need accomplish this purposes by: 
(1) regulating capital expenditures of the healthcare institution; 
(2) preventing unnecessary expansion and encouraging 
“appropriate allocation of resources for healthcare purposes”; and 
(3) reducing healthcare cost through the prevention of 
“unnecessary duplication of health resources.”70 
State licensing requirements also serve several state 
regulatory goals.  The inherent requirement in a state’s ability to 
require licenses is that such licensing requirements must relate to 
the health, moral, or general welfare of the state’s citizens.71  
Accordingly, any purpose of a license requirement must advance 
those goals.  For instance, a state may establish certain standards 
that must be satisfied as a prerequisite to engaging in the 
regulated activity, thereby being able to ensure the competency 
and fitness of the licensee.72  By vetting a licensee’s training, 
knowledge, and experience, and holding them to certain 
standards, the state protects the public from being subject to 
unreasonable risk from unqualified individuals engaging in the 
licensed activity.73  Such license protections allow for uniformity 
within the regulated field and ensure that the licensed services 
are being provided in an adequate manner. 
II. THE INHERENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE GOALS OF STATE 
 
[is] to provide the statutory ability to refuse permission to build beds 
or provide services, without providing any counter-balancing 
authority to initiate action to either build more beds when they are 
needed or develop alternative patterns of care that would make more 
beds unnecessary. 
Gerard R. Goulet, Certificate of Need Over Hospitals in Rhode Island, 15 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 127, 130 (2010).  
 69. Hospitals, supra note 68, § 9. 
 70. Hospitals and Asylums, supra note 60, § 6; 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 9 
(Westlaw 2016). 
 71. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955).  
If the license requirement is rationally related to the health, safety, morals, 
or general welfare of society, it is a proper exercise of the state’s police 
function.  Id. at 489.  As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he day is gone 
when [a] Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, 
because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a 
particular school of thought.” Id. at 488. 
 72. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Licenses and Permits §§ 51, 52 (2011). 
 73. See id. § 82. 
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REGULATION AND INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS 
In examining the purposes and goals of bankruptcy, 
receivership, and state regulation, an inherent conflict between 
the purposes of insolvency proceedings and state regulatory goals 
is evident when a healthcare institution is a debtor.74  In fact, this 
conflict was the primary focus of In re United Healthcare Systems, 
Inc.75 when a federal district court recognized that the case 
“present[ed] the very complex and difficult interrelation between 
public healthcare and bankruptcy.”76 
United Healthcare Systems, Inc. (United) was a New Jersey 
hospital that offered healthcare services to children and adults.77  
In the beginning of 1997, United, who was experiencing serious 
financial trouble, notified the Commissioner of Health and Senior 
Services of New Jersey of its economic plight, which was 
attributable to the fact that its primary lender refused to advance 
it any further funds.78  Recognizing the importance of United’s 
services to the citizens of New Jersey, the Commissioner provided 
United with $3 million to keep pediatric care operating.79  
Further, because United’s doctors and nurses were being solicited 
by other hospitals, the Commissioner issued a moratorium against 
the hiring of United’s medical staff.80 
Over the next month, United worked with the Commissioner 
to draft a request for proposal (RFP) for the sale of United’s 
 
 74. In re United Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 97-1159, 1997 WL 176574, at 
*5 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 1997). 
 75. Id.; see also Maizel & Lane, supra note 67, at 12. 
 76. In re United Healthcare, 1997 WL 176574, at *1.  The United 
Healthcare Court was the first to address the interrelation between public 
healthcare and insolvency; in fact, it noted that it was a matter of first 
impression at the time.  Id at *5. 
 77. Id. at *1. 
 78. Id.   
 79. Id.  The Commissioner stated:  
[T]he services currently provided at United are extremely critical 
and cannot be discontinued without disrupting a crucial source of 
care for the community.  United, for example, currently has over 150 
patients, including numerous neonatal and pediatric patients in 
neonatal intensive care, pediatric intensive care, neonatal 
intermediate care, and patients in a general care pediatric floor.  I 
therefore conclude that an emergency situation exits necessitating 
the use of the expedited review process.  
Id. at *2. 
 80. Id. at *1.  The moratorium was in effect until February 14, 1997.  Id.   
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assets.81 Four bidders responded to the RFP: Saint Barnabas 
Corporation (Saint Barnabas), University of Medicine and 
Dentistry of New Jersey/Cathedral Healthcare Systems, Inc. 
(University of Medicine and Dentistry), Primary Health Care 
(Primary Health), and Medical Management of America (Medical 
Management).82  After reviewing the submissions, United’s Board 
of Trustees “awarded the sale of United to Saint Barnabas.”83  The 
next day, Saint Barnabas and United negotiated and finalized a 
definite agreement that memorized the sale.84  Pursuant to the 
agreement, United was to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy so that 
Saint Barnabas would not have to assume United’s liabilities.85  
Additionally, the agreement required United and Saint Barnabas 
to apply for and obtain requisite certificates of needs and 
licenses.86  Due to the emergent nature of United’s financial crisis, 
the Commissioner granted the certificate of needs and authorized 
United to close its hospital and Saint Barnabas to operate a 
pediatric acute care facility.87 
Pursuant to the agreement, United filed bankruptcy under 
Chapter 11 of the Code the next day.88  At the same time, United 
filed an “Application for an Order Authorizing the Sale of Certain 
of Debtor’s Assets” (Sale Application) under § 363 of the Code.89  
However, University of Medicine and Dentistry filed an objection 
to the Sale Application and tendered an offer for United’s assets.90  
The bankruptcy court held that “it was the clear intention of the 
parties that . . . in the § 363 bankruptcy process the Court would 
have the opportunity to take higher and better offers, subject to 
the Commissioner’s approval required in the certificate of need 
process.”91  Further, the bankruptcy court determined that “the 
Board’s decision to award the sale to Saint Barnabas was not a 
sound business judgment” as it “defeated the ability of the 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at *2. 
 84. Id.   
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.   
 87. Id. at *2–3.   
 88. Id. at *3. 
 89. Id.   
 90. Id.   
 91. Id. (quoting In re United Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 97-21785, at *9 
(Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 5, 1997). 
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Bankruptcy Court to carry out its function to obtain a fair price for 
the debtor’s assets for the benefit of the creditors of th[e] estate.”92  
Consequently, because the sale to Saint Barnabas was not as 
beneficial to creditors as the sale to University of Medicine and 
Dentistry, the bankruptcy court voided the sale.93  United 
appealed to the district court, arguing that the bankruptcy court 
abused its discretion in voiding the sale to Saint Barnabas.94 
The district court, in its review of the bankruptcy court’s 
decision, recognized that “[t]he issue of the interrelation of [a] 
[s]tate’s healthcare concerns and the bankruptcy court’s monetary 
goals” are hard to reconcile.95  Noting that healthcare institutions 
pose unique and complex policy considerations, the district court 
held that they are “[u]nlike the sale of corporations in the private 
sector,” because a healthcare institution’s petition for insolvency 
“involves the rights and obligations of the State to govern public 
health.”96  For instance, “[t]he most valuable asset of the 
[healthcare institution], i.e., its goodwill, is inextricably 
intertwined with the requisite [certificate of needs] and licenses 
which can only be granted by the [state].”97  Accordingly, the 
district court held that a court must “look to the overriding 
consideration of public health represented by the virtual 
orchestration of the . . . sale process” of a healthcare institution.98  
With that policy consideration in mind, the district court held that 
a court “cannot mechanically apply [insolvency] principles of 
‘highest and best’ offer” in the sale of a healthcare institution.99  
The district court explained that instead, a court “must not only 
weigh the financial aspects of the transaction but also look to the 
countervailing consideration of a public health emergency.”100  
The district court further explained that courts should engage in a 
 
 92. Id.  (quoting In re United Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 97-21785, at *17 
(Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 5, 1997). 
 93. Id. The bankruptcy court found that University of Medicine and 
Dentistry’s offer “saved more jobs; gave better protection to physician 
contracts and was for more money when the waiver of [University of 
Medicine and Dentistry] over $1 million claim is factored in the equation.”  
Id. at *6. 
 94. Id. at *3.   
 95. Id. at *5.  
 96. Id.   
 97. Id.   
 98. Id.   
 99. Id.   
 100. Id. at *5.   
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“totality of the circumstances” approach and not “overwhelmingly 
focus[] on the monetary aspects of [] competing bids.”101  Because 
the bankruptcy court simply made a monetary analysis, without 
consideration to the state’s need to regulate healthcare 
institutions, the district court reversed the decision of the 
bankruptcy court and remanded the matter for further 
consideration.102 
In re United Healthcare illustrates the inherent conflict that 
exists when state regulation of healthcare institutions collides 
with the goals and purposes of insolvency proceedings.103  This 
dichotomy is seen in the differing approaches employed by the 
bankruptcy court and district court: while the bankruptcy court 
conducted a pure monetary analysis, finding “highest and best” 
offer to be appropriate because it resulted the maximum recovery 
for creditors, the district court recognized that the case presented 
a unique situation in which the “highest and best” offer may not 
yield the best result without taking public health concerns into 
account.104  In In re United Healthcare, it is apparent that the 
district court gave effect to the Commissioner’s actions and the 
state’s need for pediatric services in Newark, New Jersey, which 
served to trump University of Medicine and Dentistry’s “highest 
and best” offer.105 
The conflict between achieving a maximum recovery for 
creditors and ensuring compliance with healthcare regulation can 
be illustrated in more specific instances.  For example, a state 
regulatory agency may believe that the hospital should be closed 
completely because either the need for such services has decreased 
or the hospital cannot afford to stay open.106  However, creditors 
 
 101. Id. at *5, 6. 
 102. Id. at *5, 10. 
 103. See id. at *1–10. 
 104. Id. at *5.   
 105. See id. at *7.  The district court found that “the [bankruptcy] [c]ourt 
is without the technical and expert knowledge to second guess the 
Commissioner on public health and safety issues.”  Id. at *8.  Further, it 
pronounced that “[c]ourts are not experts in public health and safety issues 
and this Court bows to the knowledge of the Commissioner in those areas.  If 
the Commissioner felt that there was a public need for the Children’s 
Hospital to be operated as a unit . . . , federal courts should accept it as such.” 
Id.; see also Palmer & Meises, supra note 1, at 13–14.   
 106. See In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs., 429 B.R. 139, 143 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), discussed infra.  The hospital in In re Saint Vincents 
arguably closed because “the State Department of Health said there [was] no 
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may believe that a return on the hospitals assets can be 
maximized if it is sold as a going concern entity.107  Additionally, 
an acquirer of a hospital may make assumptions that it will be 
able to renegotiate Medicaid or commercial insurance contracts in 
order to receive higher reimbursement rates; yet, a state regulator 
charged with Medicaid regulation may reject such proposed 
modifications because a reimbursement rate may be statutorily 
capped.108  Or, a sale of a not-for-profit hospital to a for-profit 
entity, which may yield a higher return to the creditors, may be 
objected to by the state because such sale would result in a 
decrease in charitable healthcare.  Further, the selling hospital 
may need an expedited review of the acquiring entity’s transfer 
licenses so that a sale may be finalized; however, state regulators 
may need to conduct their due diligence to ensure the purchaser is 
qualified to provide healthcare to the state’s citizens, regardless of 
how long that process may take.109 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE REGULATORS 
A regulator can be a debtor’s most “valuable ally” or “worst 
nightmare” because of the substantial impact they can have on an 
insolvency proceeding.110  Regulators derive their powers from  (1) 
explicit powers in the Code and federal law and (2) their inherent 
powers outside the Code, such as their ability to grant or deny 
certificates of need or licenses, make capital infusions, or waive 
administrative fees.111 
 
need for an acute care hospital in Greenwich Village.”  Kevin Clarke, The 
Last Days of St. Vincent’s, AMERICA, July 5, 2010, at 18.  
 107. See In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs., 429 B.R. at 143, 
discussed infra. 
 108. Gaube v. Landmark Med. Ctr., No. 08-4371, at 3–5 (R.I. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 7, 2015) (order denying plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce); see also Richard 
Salit, Landmark denied pass on Medicaid minimums, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 
12, 2015, at A1, A6.   
 109. See Application for Expedited Consideration of First Day Matters at 
1, In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., 15-24999 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 10, 
2010), discussed infra.   
 110. Stuart Phillips & Hal F. Morris, The Care and Feeding of State 
Regulators in Chapter 11 Cases, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8, 8 (2003).   
 111. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; 28 U.S.C.A. § 959(b) (Westlaw through 
Pub. L. No. 114–244); 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 362(b)(4), 503(b) (Westlaw through Pub. 
L. No. 114–244). 
166 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:147 
A. The Code and Other Federal Laws 
Under the Code, a regulator’s importance and power stems 
from their ability to ensure that the debtor, bankruptcy trustee, or 
receiver is operating its business in a lawful manner during the 
insolvency proceedings.112  Such ability is less restrictive than 
other creditors or parties in the insolvency proceeding because 
federal law requires that the debtor comply with all state laws 
during the time of the insolvency.113  On a federal level, this grant 
of power and authority to state regulatory agencies is found in the 
Code, the U.S. Code, and the U.S. Constitution.114 
The U.S. Code requires that all trustees, receivers, and 
debtors in possession comply with state regulations and laws 
during the insolvency proceeding.  Specifically, 
a trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any cause 
pending in any court of the United States, including a 
debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the 
property in his possession as such trustee, receiver or 
manager according to the requirements of the valid laws 
of the State in which such property is situated, in the 
same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would 
be bound to do if in possession thereof.115 
Courts have interpreted this section of the U.S. Code to mean 
that the trustee, receiver, or debtor in possession must comply 
with state laws and regulation as if no insolvency proceeding were 
in place.116 
 
 112. Phillips & Morris, supra note 110, at 8. 
 113. See id.; 28 U.S.C.A. § 959(b) (Westlaw). Any state action, proceeding 
or judgment against a debtor in order to enforce the state’s regulatory power 
is exempt from the automatic stay.  See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(4) (Westlaw). 
“The legislative history for this police power exception is sparse, but it 
indicates that the police power exception was not intended to be given an 
expanded interpretation.  Rather, Congress intended only to safeguard the 
states’ ability to protect the health and safety of their citizens.”  Sward, supra 
note 6, at 421–22.   
 114. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; 28 U.S.C.A. § 959(b) (Westlaw); 11 
U.S.C.A. §§ 362(b)(4), 503(b) (Westlaw); see also Phillips & Morris, supra note 
110, at 8. 
 115. 28 U.S.C.A. § 959(b) (Westlaw).   
 116. Phillips & Morris, supra note 110, at 8; see also SEC v. Wealth 
Mgmt., LLC, 628 F.3d 323, 334 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Just as an owner or 
possessor of property is required to comply with state law, so too must a 
receiver comply with state law in the ‘management and operation’ of the 
receivership property in his possession.”).   
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Specific to bankruptcy, certain exceptions have been carved 
out of the Code for regulators.  First, in certain instances, 
regulators may claim an exception to the automatic stay.117  While 
the automatic stay affords a debtor relief inasmuch as it halts or 
prevents any claims against the debtor, an exception exists to the 
automatic stay for a state to exercise its “police powers.”118  “This 
so-called ‘police power exception’ specifically empowers regulators 
to continue to exercise their police and regulatory power against 
the debtor (including, incidentally, fixing the amount of fines or 
penalties owed to the government).”119  Second, in a bankruptcy 
proceeding, the Code provides that regulatory fees and fines 
imposed post-petition for bankruptcy are to be treated as 
administrative expenses, and thus entitled to priority in 
distributing the estate.120  Further empowering a state regulator 
in a bankruptcy proceeding is the fact that the Eleventh 
Amendment to the Constitution protects any state (or its 
regulatory agencies) from being a part of a federal law suit; 
therefore, a debtor in bankruptcy may only have limited 
circumstances in which it is seek remedies against the 
regulator.121 
As seen above, the Code, the U.S. Code, and the U.S. 
Constitution provide a state regulator with the ability and power 
to drastically change and affect the outcome of an insolvency 
proceeding by assuring the debtor’s lawful compliance with state 
laws, or increasing fees, costs, and administrative expenses 
charged to the estate. 
B. Inherent Powers Outside the Code 
Regulators further derive their power from their inherent 
 
 117. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(4) (Westlaw). 
 118. See id.   
 119. Phillips & Morris, supra note 110, at 8; see also In re Saint Vincents 
Catholic Med. Ctrs., 429 B.R. 139, 148 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Courts have 
narrowly construed 362(b)(4) to allow actions by governmental units to 
continue if they are enforcing laws affecting health, welfare and public safety 
and not to merely protect its pecuniary interest.”).   
 120. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b) (Westlaw). 
 121. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or 
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); Phillips & Morris, supra note 
110, at 8.   
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ability to approve, deny, or otherwise modify any license or 
certificate of need necessary to operate a healthcare institution or 
to affect a healthcare institution’s finances by making capital 
infusions, waiving licensing fees, or issuing loans secured by 
bonds. 
1. Licenses and Certificates of Need 
Perhaps the most obvious and inherent power of a regulator is 
its ability to approve licenses and certificates of need because such 
approval is a requisite to operation of a healthcare institution.122  
If an entity wishes to operate a hospital, it must first receive 
approval from the state’s department of health.123  Therefore, the 
department of health’s decision as to whether to grant a license or 
certificate of need is a gateway to operating a hospital; the 
existence or non-existence of a hospital is dependent upon the 
department of health’s decision and finding that such hospital is 
needed.  Such ultimate determination gives the department of 
health the power over the operation or closure of healthcare 
institutions.  For example, Peninsula Hospital was a New-York-
based not-for-profit teaching hospital with resident-training 
programs in “orthopedics, general surgery and family practice.”124  
Peninsula Hospital faced serious financial trouble and submitted 
a plan of closure to the New York Department of Health (NY 
DOH).125  However, that plan of closure was subsequently 
withdrawn126 and, on August 16, 2011, an involuntary Chapter 11 
petition was filed against Peninsula Hospital.127 Thereafter, NY 
DOH informed Peninsula Hospital that it was “extremely 
concerned about the current ability of Peninsula to admit new 
patients in a manner that maintain[ed] patient safety and me[t] 
minimum standards required by the State Hospital Code.”128  As a 
 
 122. See Hospitals and Asylums, supra note 60, § 5. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Urban & Berkowitz, supra note 1, at 1. 
 125. Id.   
 126. Id.   
 127. See Involuntary Chapter 11 Petition, In re Peninsula Hospital Ctr., 
11-47056 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2011), ECF No. 1.  Peninsula Hospital 
ultimately consented to an order for relief.  See Consent To The Entry Of An 
Order For Relief, In re Peninsula Hospital Ctr., 11-47056 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 19, 2011), ECF No. 20.   
 128. Urban & Berkowitz, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Letter from Richard 
M. Cook, Deputy Commissioner, Office of Health Systems Management, to 
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result, NY DOH prohibited Peninsula Hospital from admitting 
any new patients.129 
Five months later, Wadsworth Center, a public health 
laboratory that was run by NY DOH, conducted an inspection at 
Peninsula Hospital that resulted in the issuance of two summary 
orders: (1) an order summarily suspending Peninsula Hospital’s 
clinical laboratory permit for thirty days; and (2) an order 
determining that the continued operation of Peninsula Hospital 
without the services of its clinical laboratory poses a danger to the 
health of current and future patents and required that Peninsula 
Hospital divert ambulances, cease admitting new patients, 
immediately develop a plan to relocate current patients, cancel all 
surgeries and procedures, and suspend all general activity 
dependent on laboratory services.130 
One day after the issuance of the NY DOH’s orders, the U.S. 
Trustee filed a motion seeking the appointment of a Chapter 11 
Trustee, arguing that there was gross mismanagement of 
Peninsula Hospital and that the appointment of a trustee was in 
the best interests of Peninsula Hospital’s creditors.131  Upon 
consent of the parties, a Chapter 11 Trustee was appointed.132  
Following operational and financial due diligence, the Chapter 11 
Trustee submitted a plan of closure for Peninsula Hospital, which 
was approved by NY DOH—the hospital promptly closed and 
thereafter on April 9, 2012, its emergency department and 
services no dependent on a clinical laboratory ceased.133  It has 
been observed that NY DOH’s decision to close Peninsula 
Hospital’s clinical laboratory “sealed the hospital’s fate,” and lead 
 
Robert Levine, President and CEO, Peninsula Hospital Center (Aug. 19, 
2011) (on file with N.Y. Department of Health)). 
 129. Id.   
 130. See Motion to Appoint Trustee Pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 1104(a)(1) and 
(2) at Exs. C and D, In re Peninsula Hospital Ctr., 11-47056 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 24, 2012), ECF Nos. 438-4, 438-5.   
 131. See Motion to Appoint Trustee Pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 1104(a)(1) and 
(2) at 19-20, In re Peninsula Hospital Ctr., 11-47056 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 
24, 2012), ECF No. 438. 
 132. Consent Order Directing the United States Trustee to Appoint a 
Chapter 11 Trustee, In re Peninsula Hospital Ctr., 11-47056 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012), ECF No. 463.   
 133. See Status Report of Chapter 11 Trustee at 1–2, In re Peninsula 
Hospital Ctr., 11-47056 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012), ECF No. 510; see 
also Second Status Report of Chapter 11 Trustee at 2, In re Peninsula 
Hospital Ctr., 11-47056 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012), ECF No. 542. 
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to its ultimate closure.134 
2. Capital Infusions 
After the grant of the requisite licenses, or during the 
insolvency proceeding, state regulators can also affect a 
healthcare institution’s financial status by making capital 
infusions, waiving fees, and issuing loans.  As seen in In re United 
Healthcare supra and discussed infra in Part IV, state regulatory 
agencies have assisted distressed hospitals by giving them 
operating capital to prevent bankruptcy and allow time for a 
transfer of ownership.135  The capital allows the hospital to 
continue operation and ensures the state regulator that the public 
need is being met while also allowing time for the hospital to seek 
sponsors, partners, or potential purchasers to help satisfy its 
obligations to its creditors.136  Such capital contribution literally 
can “buy time” for an insolvent hospital to assess its financial 
options and determine a plan of action, making regulators a 
valuable ally in tough economic times.  Capital infusions by state 
regulators typically take the form of “debtor in possession” (DIP) 
financing from the state.137  For instance, Interfaith Medical 
Centers, a not-for-profit hospital in New York, successfully 
navigated through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy because the NY DOH 
 
 134. Rich Brockman, Peninsula Trustee Alleges Fraud Lead to Closure, 
TIMES LEDGER (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.timesledger.com/stories/ 
2013/38/peninsulalawsuit_tl_2013_09_20_q.html; see also N.Y. STATE DEP’T 
OF HEALTH, REPORT ON THE CLOSING OF PENINSULA HOSPITAL (2012), 
https://www.health.ny.gov/events/public_hearing_reports/peninsula_hospital/
docs/2012-07-10_public_hearing_closure_rpt.pdf. 
 135. See In re Interfaith Med. Ctr., Inc., 1-12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Dec. 
2, 2012); In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., 10-11963 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010); In re United Healthcare Sys., Inc., 1997 WL 176574 
(L. Civ. R. Mar. 26, 1997). 
 136. See, e.g., Debtor’s Motion for Interim and Final Orders: (I) 
Authorizing the Debtor to Utilize Cash Collateral of Prepetition Secured 
Party; (II) Granting a Superpriority Claim; (III) Granting Adequate 
Protection; (IV) Providing Related Relief; and (V) Scheduling a Final Hearing 
at 3, In re Interfaith Med. Ctr., Inc., 1-12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 
2012), ECF No. 7 [hereinafter Debtor’s Motion for Interim and Final Orders].  
 137. See id. at 1–9 (noting that many DIP loans treat the state as a bank); 
Pei Shan Hoe, Hospital troubles leave taxpayers on hook to pay back state 
loans, THE NEW YORK WORLD (May 22, 2012), http://www.thenewyorkworld. 
com/2012/05/22/hospital-troubles-leave-taxpayers-on-hook-to-pay-back-state-
loans.  DIP loans by the state are typically backed by bonds, and the bonds 
are guaranteed by the state. Id.  Therefore, if the hospitals fail to pay the 
bonds, the state must pay the investors.  Id. 
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and Dormitory Authority of New York (DANY) gave it a capital 
infusion to filibuster its closure.138  After Interfaith Hospital 
(Interfaith) entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, NY DOH was 
dissatisfied with the management of Interfaith and in a letter to 
Interfaith’s Board of Directors explained that it would only fund 
Interfaith if Interfaith submitted a business restructuring plan 
that would enable Interfaith to operate outside of Chapter 11 
without future funding by NY DOH.139  Interfaith submitted its 
restructuring plan, but NY DOH rejected the plan as not “fiscally 
viable”; therefore, NY DOH ordered Interfaith to submit a plan of 
closure.140  NY DOH indicated that if the plan of closure were 
submitted, DIP financing would be available but such availability 
was conditioned on closure of Interfaith.141  Because no other 
funding was available, and a transfer of ownership looked 
unfeasible, Interfaith submitted a motion to the bankruptcy court 
for approval to close.142  With Interfaith’s only option besides 
closing being receiving funding from the state, the bankruptcy 
court continued Interfaith’s motion to close, and referred the 
closure to mediation with the hope that an agreement could be 
made between NY DOH and Interfaith.143  Despite hesitation by 
NY DOH, the matter emerged from mediation with an agreement 
between Interfaith, NY DOH, and DANY, in which DANY’s DIP 
 
 138. See Debtor’s Motion for Interim and Final Orders, supra note 136, at 
2–5. 
 139. Declaration of John D. Leech in Support of Debtor’s Motion for Entry 
of an Order Pursuant to Sections 105, 363, and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
Authorizing the Debtor to Implement, in Accordance with New York State 
Law, a Plan of Closure for the Debtor’s Hospital and Certain Affiliated 
Outpatient Clinics and Practices at Exhibit A, In re Interfaith Med. Ctr., Inc., 
12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2013), ECF No. 673 [hereinafter 
Declaration of John D. Leech]. 
 140. Id. at Exs. B, C. 
 141. Id. at Ex. C. 
 142. Notice Of Hearing On Debtor’s Motion For Entry Of An Order 
Pursuant To Sections 105, 363 And 1108 of The Bankruptcy Code, 
Authorizing the Debtor to Implement, In Accordance With New York State 
Law, a Plan of Closure For the Debtor’s Hospital and Certain Affiliated 
Outpatient Clinics and Practices at Ex. A, In re Interfaith Med. Ctr., Inc., 12-
48226 (July 30, 2013), ECF No. 602 [hereinafter Interfaith’s Motion to Close]; 
Nina Bernstein, Interfaith Med. Ctr. Plans to Close, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/nyregion/interfaith-medical-center 
-plans-to-close.html?_r=0. 
 143. See Order Assigning Matter to Mediation, In re Interfaith Med. Ctr., 
Inc., 12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013), EFC No. 797.   
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loan would be modified so that Interfaith may receive a capital 
infusion in the amount of $7.5 million for it to continue operations, 
$3.5 million of which was to be from NY DOH.144  Because of this 
capital infusion, Interfaith was able to avoid closure, continue 
operations, and successfully adopt a plan of reorganization.145 
3. Administrative Fees 
State regulators can financially assist a distressed hospital by 
waiving or deferring payment of administrative fees, such as 
licensing fees.  As reimbursement models have changed, licensing 
fees have steadily increased from year to year.146  As the costs of 
licensing fees enter the millions147, a state regulator’s ability to 
enforce, defer, or otherwise waive the fee gives that regulator the 
ability to drastically affect a hospital’s financial status.  For 
example, in Kinney v. Westerly Hospital Healthcare, Inc., 
addressed infra, prior to its insolvency, Westerly Hospital was 
paying $3.5 million in licensing fees.148  During its receivership 
proceeding, the Rhode Island Division of Taxation (who is charged 
 
 144. See Stipulation and Order Modifying Final DIP Order, In re 
Interfaith Med. Ctr., Inc., 12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014), ECF No. 
864; Paul DeBenedetto, Interfaith to Stay Open Until March as Judge 
Approves $25 Million, BEDFORD-STUYVESANT (Jan. 28, 2014), 
https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20140128/bed-stuy/interfaith-stay-open-
until-march-as-judge-approves-25-million.   
 145. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Confirming Second 
Amended Plan of Reorganization for Interfaith Medical Center, Inc., In re 
Interfaith Med. Ctr., Inc., 12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2014), ECF 
No. 1158. The Reorganization plan calls for NY DOH to assume control of 
Interfaith Hospital and replace senior management in return for additional 
state funding.  Id. 
 146. See S. FISCAL OFFICE, ISSUE BRIEF: MEDICAID DISPROPORTIONATE 
SHARE HOSPITAL PAYMENTS at 3 (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/ 
sfiscal/Other%20Documents/Medicaid%20Disproportionate%20Share%20Hos
pital%20(DSH)%20Program.pdf; see also R.I. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF TAX’N, 
NOTICE: HOSPITAL LICENSING FEE INCREASE FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING ON OR 
AFTER JANUARY 1, 2013 (July 2015), http://www.tax.ri.gov/Tax%20Website/ 
TAX/notice/Notice%202015-07%20—%20Hospital%20licensing%20fee%20 
change.pdf; CAL. DEP’T. OF PUB. HEALTH, HEALTH FACILITY LICENSE FEES 
ANNUAL REPORT FY 2012–2013 at 6 (2012), available at https://www. 
cdph.ca.gov/pubsforms/fiscalrep/Documents/LicCertAnnualReport2012.pdf. 
 147. See ISSUE BRIEF: MEDICAID DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITAL 
PAYMENTS, supra note 146; NOTICE: HOSPITAL LICENSING FEE INCREASE FOR 
FISCAL YEAR ENDING ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2013, supra note 146.   
 148. S. FISCAL OFFICE, ISSUE BRIEF: HOSPITALS IN R.I. FISCAL OVERVIEW at 
13 (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/sfiscal/ Other%20Documents/ 
Hospitals%20Financial%20Overview.pdf. 
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with the enforcement of hospital licensing fees) brought a claim 
for payment of Westerly Hospital’s licensing fee in the amount of 
$4,420,600.149  Pursuant to the Rhode Island Department of 
Health’s authority to issue and revoke operating licenses, it 
threatened to revoke Westerly Hospital’s operating license if the 
fee was not paid.150 
A review of the above reveals that a regulator’s power is 
founded in many areas, is extensive, and can have a drastic 
impact on an insolvency proceeding.  Accordingly, it is evident 
that state regulators deserve “special attention” in healthcare 
insolvency proceedings.151 
IV. CASE STUDIES 
The dichotomy between bankruptcy, receivership, and state 
regulatory goals, as addressed in In re United Healthcare, exploits 
the inherent conflict between a state’s regulatory police power and 
the goals of insolvency proceedings.  While such conflict is far-
reaching in application,152 this section of this Article will focus on 
the conflict between the goals of insolvency proceedings and state 
regulation in the purview of healthcare institutions. Specifically, 
this Article and the following section will analyze cases in which a 
healthcare institution has entered an insolvency proceeding—
either bankruptcy or receivership—and how the conflict between 
the goals of state regulation and insolvency are achieved by the 
early and active participation of state regulators.  This section will 
address two cases: In re Saint Vincent’s Catholic Medical Centers 
of New York and In re Saint Michael’s Medical Centers, Inc.  The 
matter of In re Saint Vincent’s illustrates that the active 
participation of state regulatory agencies can result in the 
successful wind down of a hospital, while obtaining a satisfactory 
recovery for creditors.153  In re Saint Michael’s demonstrates that 
when regulators are not involved in insolvency, such lack of 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Order, Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, Inc., 2011-0781 (May 9, 
2013). 
 151. Phillips & Morris, supra note 110, at 8.   
 152. This conflict has been subject to scholarly review in several other 
areas. The area that has received the most attention has been the 
intersection of a state’s environmental regulatory power over an entity while 
that entity is in bankruptcy or receivership.   See Sward, supra note 6, at 404.  
 153. See In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., 10-11963 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010). 
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involvement may have detrimental affects on the overall transfer 
of assets or recovery for the hospital’s creditors.154  This section 
will also review Kinney and give a judicial perspective on how 
regulator involvement can affect receivership proceedings. 
A. In re Saint Vincent’s  
Saint Vincent’s Catholic Medical Centers of New York (St. 
Vincent’s Network), and certain of its affiliates, was an acute-care 
hospital network in New York City that provided healthcare 
services to “all who [came] to [them] in need, especially the 
poor.”155  St. Vincent’s Network operated numerous businesses, 
including a behavioral health facility, nursing homes, continuing 
care facilities, a hospice, and a home health agency; however, its 
core business centered around the operation of its hospital, St. 
Vincent’s Hospital Manhattan (St. Vincent’s Hospital), which was 
located in the Greenwich Village section of Manhattan.156  St. 
Vincent’s Hospital was a 727-bed facility that offered medical 
services for acute-care, including behavioral health, cancer, 
cardiology, HIV treatment, orthopedic surgery, obstetric and 
maternity services, pediatrics, intensive care units, rehabilitation, 
and child psychiatry.157 
In 2000, St. Vincent’s Network merged with several other 
hospitals and healthcare facilities; however, after the merger, St. 
Vincent’s Network faced financial difficulties and filed a Chapter 
11 bankruptcy petition in 2005.158  After a two-year long Chapter 
11 proceeding, in 2007, St. Vincent’s Network emerged from 
bankruptcy with a consummated plan of reorganization that 
 
 154. In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., et al., 15-24999 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
Aug. 10, 2015). 
 155. Motion of the Debtors for Entry of Interim and Final Orders 
Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 363, and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code (A) 
Authorizing the Debtors to Continue the Implementation, in Accordance with 
New York State Law, of a Plan of Closure for the Debtors’ Manhattan 
Hospitals and Certain Affiliated Outpatient Clinics and Practices; and (B) 
Scheduling a Final Hearing at 3, ¶ 9, In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. 
Ctrs. of N.Y., 10-11963 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Motion to 
Close].   
 156. Declaration of Mark E. Toney Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 
1008-2 and in Support of First Day Motions and Applications at ¶ 5, In re 
Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y, 10-11963 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
14, 2010) [hereinafter Toney Affidavit].   
 157. Id. at 5, ¶¶ 13, 15. 
 158. Id. at 15–16, ¶ 34.  
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restructured its debts, which totaled over $1 billion.159  
Subsequent to the bankruptcy, St. Vincent’s Network continued to 
face financial difficulty; while revenues remained consistent, in 
2008 and 2009, it suffered operating losses of $43 million and $64 
million, respectively.160  In 2008 and 2009, St. Vincent’s Hospital 
alone had an operating loss of $81 million and $107 million, 
respectively.161  As a result, in 2009, St. Vincent’s Network’s 
Board of Directors appointed a “Restructuring Committee” that 
was tasked with the oversight of the network’s financial 
restructuring and to determine and evaluate all of its strategic 
alternatives.162  However, at the end of 2009, St. Vincent’s 
Network’s liquidity crisis remained.163  From December 2009 to 
February 2010 the network’s senior management began 
discussions with its major creditors and informed them of St. 
Vincent’s Network’s distressed financial condition.164  St. 
Vincent’s Network also discussed with its creditors its options to 
preserve St. Vincent’s Hospital’s long-term viability, including 
selling the network’s non-hospital assets to another healthcare 
provider.165  However, in early February 2010, St. Vincent’s 
Network’s economic state had deteriorated to the point where it 
was unable to make its upcoming payroll.166  To ensure that St. 
Vincent’s Network could make its payroll and to prevent a 
bankruptcy filing, the NY DOH and two of the network’s current 
creditors, General Electric Corporation and T.D. Bank, N.A., 
provided it with a $6 million emergency loan.167 
After St. Vincent’s Network’s financial crisis drew the 
attention of state agencies, on February 3, 2010, the then-
governor of New York, David Paterson, held a meeting with St. 
Vincent’s Network’s management, NY DOH officials, elected 
officials, “senior secured lenders, union leaders, and other key 
constituents.”168  At this meeting Governor Paterson requested 
 
 159. Id. at 15, ¶ 35. 
 160. Id. at 25, ¶ 62. 
 161. Id.   
 162. Toney Affidavit, supra note 156, at 14, ¶ 32. 
 163. Motion to Close, supra note 155, at 6, ¶ 16.   
 164. Toney Affidavit, supra note 156, at 27, ¶ 69. 
 165. Id.   
 166. Id. at 27, ¶ 70. 
 167. Id.; see Motion to Close, supra note 155, at 7, ¶ 18.   
 168. Toney Affidavit, supra note 156, at 27, ¶ 71; Motion to Close, supra 
note 155, at 7, ¶ 19. 
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that the parties in attendance form a “task force” that would take 
the lead on securing emergency financing to allow St. Vincent’s 
time to research and assess its options—“outside of bankruptcy—
for an alliance, affiliation, partnership, or new sponsorship with a 
financially stronger healthcare group or chain.”169  This task 
force, which included representatives from NY DOH, “was closely 
engaged in the restructuring process,” and met by telephone and 
in person almost on a daily basis.170  Simultaneously, St. Vincent’s 
Network, with the assistance of its investment bankers and 
brokers—Cain Brothers & Company, LLP, Shattuck Hammond 
Partners, and Loeb & Troper, LLP—worked to market and sell the 
network’s non-hospital assets to other healthcare facilities.171 
As St. Vincent’s Hospital continued to face deficits, and in an 
attempt to prevent the costs of an all-out shut down of the 
hospital, St. Vincent’s Network began searching for a partner, 
sponsor, or any other affiliation for the hospital that would 
preserve its operations.172  St. Vincent’s Network discussed 
potential business deals with more than ten major hospitals or 
healthcare institutions, including Mount Sinai Medical Center, 
New York Presbyterian, and New York University-Langone 
Medical Center, just to name a few.173  These institutions, after 
signing confidentiality agreements, were permitted to view all 
information related to St. Vincent’s Network and St. Vincent’s 
Hospital.174  During this process, Mount Sinai emerged as the 
most interested and qualified candidate, conducting over sixty 
hours of document review, making sixty facility visits to St. 
Vincent’s Hospital, and attending several meetings with St. 
Vincent’s Network’s management.175  Despite all of its due 
diligence, Mount Sinai withdrew as a potential purchaser on 
March 31, 2010.176 
After Mount Sinai withdrew as a potential purchaser of St. 
Vincent’s Hospital, it was evident that no other viable entities 
were interested or qualified to purchase, partner, or sponsor the 
 
 169. Toney Affidavit, supra note 156, at 28, ¶ 72. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. at 15, ¶ 33. 
 172. Id. at 29, ¶ 76. 
 173. Id. at 30, ¶ 77.  
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 30, ¶ 78. 
 176. Id. at 30, ¶ 79. 
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hospital as a “going-concern[]” entity.177  As a result, on April 6, 
2010, St. Vincent’s Network’s board voted to approve the closure of 
St. Vincent’s Hospital for the health and safety of its patients.178  
Two days later, the network submitted a closure plan to the NY 
DOH for its approval, and began the wind-down of its 
operations.179  At this juncture, while NY DOH did not formally 
approve the closure plan, NY DOH was actively involved in 
“numerous discussions [with the network] . . . regarding the 
possibility of a closure.”180  The closure plan required the 
following: 
(a) the orderly discharge or relocation of all patients to 
neighboring hospitals as quickly and safely as 
manageable; (ii) the redirection of emergency room 
admissions while keeping the Hospital’s emergency room 
open as a ‘treat and release or transfer’ urgent care center 
through April 15, 2010; (iii) the continued operation of 
certain outpatient clinics for a limited period of time to 
allow for the possibility of their transfer to new sponsors; 
(iv) the transfer and storage of medical records in 
compliance with all regulations; (v) the orderly and safe 
disposition of the Hospital’s equipment, pharmaceuticals, 
and inventory through appropriate channels in full 
compliance with regulatory requirements and (vi) the 
implementation of a communication program for patients, 
families, employees, providers and the community at 
large.181 
The closure plan further required that all inpatient operations 
at St. Vincent’s Hospital cease by April 30, 2010.182  During the 
month of April, in carrying out the wind-down of the hospital and 
the closure plan, St. Vincent’s Network lacked liquid funds to 
continue its closure, and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on April 
14, 2010.  On the same day, St. Vincent’s Network filed a motion 
to continue to operate pursuant to §§ 1107 and 1108 of the Code 
 
 177. Id. at 31, ¶ 80. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Motion to Close, supra note 155, at 10, ¶ 27–28. (“New York State 
regulations require that a hospital obtain written approval of the DOH to 
close.”) (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 401.3(g)).   
 180. Id. at 10, ¶ 28. 
 181. Toney Affidavit, supra note 156, at 31, ¶ 82. 
 182. Motion to Close, supra note 155, at 3, ¶ 3. 
178 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:147 
and the motion to close.183  A hearing was held on the motion to 
close on April 15, 2010, and the motion to close was granted on an 
interim basis.184 
During the bankruptcy and implementation of the closure 
plan, NY DOH was actively involved with St. Vincent’s 
Network.185  NY DOH, along with other government regulatory 
agencies, assisted St. Vincent’s Network in preventing a 
“disruption of patient care and [to] ensure a smooth transition of 
[St. Vincent’s Hospital’s] patients to new care providers.”186  NY 
DOH accomplished this successful and smooth closure by 
submitting input on the closure timeline,187 assisting in the 
transfer and discharge of hospital patients,188 soliciting 
sponsorships for St. Vincent’s Hospital’s HIV Extension Clinics,189 
assisting with the transfer of behavioral health patients,190 and 
drafting and disseminating communications regarding St. 
Vincent’s Hospital’s closure to other agencies and the public.191  
During the bankruptcy, it was noted that NY DOH “[has] been 
immersed in this case for several months now from the very 
beginning and [it has] worked very closely with [St.] Vincent’s 
Hospital on [its] closure.”192  Such collaborative effort included 
“daily phone calls from top management to staff . . . [and] on-site 
monitors who [were] at the hospital to verify the closure that’s 
being done.”193 
On May 14, 2010, the bankruptcy court granted the final 
order of closure, charging NY DOH and St. Vincent’s Network 
with the completion of the closure plan.194  After the final order of 
 
 183. Id. at 4, ¶ 8. 
 184. In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., 429 B.R. 139, 143 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 185. Id. (Saint Vincent’s Network “worked under the supervision and with 
the active participation of the New York State Department of Health to 
implement the closure plan.”). 
 186. Id.   
 187. Motion to Close, supra note 155, at 11–12, ¶ 33. 
 188. Id. at 12, ¶ 35. 
 189. Id. at 12–13, ¶ 36. 
 190. Id. at 11–12, ¶ 33. 
 191. Id. at 14–15, ¶ 40. 
 192. In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., 429 B.R. 139, 145 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 193. Id.  
 194. Final Order Pursuant to Sections 105(A), 363, And 1108 of the 
Bankruptcy Code Authorizing the Debtors to Continue the Implementation, 
in Accordance with New York State Law, of a Plan of Closure for the Debtors’ 
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closure was approved, St. Vincent’s Network, with the assistance 
of NY DOH, began selling its assets.195  As a result of its financial 
condition and the closure of St. Vincent’s Hospital, St. Vincent’s 
Network was no longer able to provide hospice care for patients 
and began marketing Pax Christi Hospice, Inc. (Pax Christi), one 
of its other assets.196  Ultimately, Visiting Nurse Service of New 
York Hospice Care (VNS) purchased Pax Christi for $9 million.197  
Notably, NY DOH indicated that it would issue VNS an 
emergency certificate of need to operate Pax Christi.198 Under 
normal circumstances, the review and the grant of a certificate of 
need may take many months.199 “However, in recognition of the 
critical need for continued operations at [Pax Christi] . . . [St. 
Vincent’s Network] received indications from the [NY DOH] that 
it would consent to approving VNS as hospice operator on an 
expedited basis.”200  Such emergency approval by NY DOH “would 
allow VNS to step in and operate the hospice even though the 
formal Certificate of Need approval process has not been 
completed, contingent upon VNS completing the process after the 
closing of the transaction.”201  NY DOH’s expedited approval of 
VNS was based upon the “DOH’s belief that VNS [was] an 
appropriate operator” of hospice services.202  Because of the 
liquidation value of $9 million, and NY DOH’s assurances that 
VNS was an adequate provider of hospice services, the bankruptcy 
court confirmed the expedited sale of Pax Christi’s assets to 
 
Manhattan Hospital and Certain Affiliated Outpatient Clinics and Practices 
at 18, In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., et al., No. 10-11963 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2010) [hereinafter Final Order to Close]. 
 195. Emergency Motion of the Debtors for an Order (A) Approving the 
Sale of Assets of Pax Christi Hospice, Inc. on an Expedited Basis to Visiting 
Nurse Service of New York Hospice Care, Free and Clear of Liens, Claims, 
Encumbrances and Other Interests; (B) Approving the Retention of an 
Appraiser in Connection with the Sale; (C) Authorizing the Debtors to Enter 
Into a Management Consulting Agreement; and (D) Authorizing Payment of 
the Investment Bankers’ Transaction Fee, In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. 
Ctrs. of N.Y., No. 10-11963 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2010) [hereinafter 
Motion to Sell Pax Christi].  
 196. Id. at 8, ¶¶ 14–15, 19. 
 197. Id. ¶ 29. 
 198. Id. at 3–4, ¶ 8. 
 199. Id. at 9, ¶ 22. 
 200. Id.  
 201. Id. at 9, ¶ 22. 
 202. Id. at 16, ¶ 36. 
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VNS.203 
St. Vincent’s Network also began marketing its behavioral 
health assets,204 and entered into an agreement with St. Joseph’s 
Medical Center (St. Joseph’s), who agreed to purchase the 
behavioral health assets for $18 million.205  Again, NY DOH 
assisted with the transaction to make the transfer as seamless as 
possible.206  NY DOH, along with other governmental 
organizations, “repeatedly indicated their strenuous objection to 
any closure of [St. Vincent’s Network’s] various inpatient and 
outpatient behavioral health programs.”207  Accordingly, it agreed 
to expedite and facilitate the transfer of the network’s behavioral 
health programs and services to St. Joseph’s, which NY DOH 
prequalified as a competent purchaser.208 Alternatively, if NY 
DOH could not get approval from the appropriate counsels, NY 
DOH indicated that it would issue St. Joseph’s emergency 
approval of its certificate of need and other licenses to ensure 
adequate patient care.209 
Various other sales of assets constituted the remainder of St. 
Vincent’s Network’s Chapter 11 proceeding, but the majority did 
not involve regulator involvement.  For example, several real 
 
 203. Order (A) Approving the Sale of Assets of Pax Christi Hospice, Inc. on 
an Expedited Basis to Visiting Nurse Service of New York Hospice Care, Free 
and Clear of Liens, Claims, Encumbrances and Other Interests; (B) 
Approving the Retention of an Appraiser in Connection with the Sale; (C) 
Authorizing the Debtors to Enter into a Management Consulting Agreement; 
and (D) Authorizing Payment of the Investment Bankers’ Transaction Fee at 
8, ¶ 4, In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., No. 10-11963 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2010) [hereinafter Final Order to Sell Pax Christi]. 
 204. Debtors’ Motion for (I) An Order (A) Approving the Sale of 
Substantially All the Debtors’ Behavioral Health Assets Including the 
Operations of St. Vincent’s Hospital Westchester to Saint Joseph’s Medical 
Center, and (B) Approving the Assumption and Assignment of Certain 
Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases; (II) an Order (A) Approving 
Bidding Procedures for the Auction of a Real Estate Option, and (B) 
Scheduling an Auction and Real Estate Option Sale Hearing; and (III) an 
Order Approving the Sale of the Real Estate Option at 11, ¶ 25, In re Saint 
Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., No. 10-11963 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 
2010) [hereinafter Motion to Sell Behavioral Health Assets] (“The marketing 
process for the Behavioral Health Assets commenced before the filing of these 
Chapter 11 Cases had been ongoing.”). 
 205. Id. at 14, ¶ 33. 
 206. Id. at 19, ¶ 44. 
 207. Id. at 20, ¶ 46. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 21, ¶¶ 47, 67. 
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estate sales occurred in an attempt to satisfy the network’s 
outstanding obligations;210 however, such transactions are not 
subject to certificate of need requirements or other forms of 
healthcare regulation, and thus are outside the scope of this 
Article.  After a full liquidation of assets, unsecured creditors 
received five to ten cents on the dollar of the $875 million they 
were owed.211 
In re Saint Vincent’s reveals the importance of involving state 
regulators in a healthcare insolvency so that during the 
healthcare organization’s liquidation they may assist with the 
transfer of assets and coordinate the appropriate licenses or 
certificate of needs.  While NY DOH was widely criticized by the 
public and the media for facilitating the “closure” of a hospital 
through its nonfeasance212, quite the opposite is true.  NY DOH 
was actively involved in St. Vincent’s Network’s financial crisis 
even before the bankruptcy, working together with St. Vincent’s 
Network to achieve a successful business model.213  Further, NY 
 
 210. Samuel Howard, St. Vincent’s Inks $260M Sale to Real Estate 
Kingpin, LAW360 (Apr. 8, 2011, 3:29 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
237690/st-vincent-s-inks-260m-sale-to-real-estate-kingpin. St. Vincent’s sold 
the real estate that hosted its hospital to Rudin Management Co. for $260 
million.  Rudin proceeded to build a 200-unit condominium complex on the 
former site of St. Vincent’s, and have sold the condominiums, on average, for 
$3,500 per square foot.  Daniel Geiger, Condos at Old St. Vincent’s Site Fetch 
$3,500 PSF, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Feb. 18, 2015, 1:20 PM), http://www. 
crainsnewyork.com/article/20150218/REAL_ESTATE/150219857/sales-at-com 
plex-on-old-st-vincents-hospital-site-defy-high-end-condo-glut (describing how 
Rudin had just sold one of five townhouses being built for nearly $25 million).   
 211. Gale Scott, St. Vincent’s Emerges from Bankruptcy, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. 
(July 6, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20120706/ 
health_care/120709941/. 
 212. See In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., 429 B.R. 139, 
152 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that certain plaintiff initiated an action 
against DOH in an attempt to prevent St. Vincent’s closure); see also Kevin 
Clarke, The Last Days of St. Vincent’s, AMERICA (July 29, 2016), http:// 
americamagazine.org/issue/742/article/last-days-st-vincents.  Many have said 
that DOH “nailed the coffin closed” during the closure of St. Vincent’s, while 
others attributed it to the “politics in the city of New York.” Id. In fact, a 
board member remarked that “I think the easiest way to explain why . . . St. 
Vincent’s is closing its doors tomorrow . . . is that the [DOH] said there is no 
need for an acute care hospital in Greenwich Village. Id. And while St. 
Vincent’s had many problems, they were on their way to being fixed.  Id.  But 
with the Department of Health saying that there’s no need for an acute care 
hospital here, the board had no choice but accept a vote to close.” Id. 
 213. State DOH Response on St. Vincent’s, VILLAGER (July 29, 2016), 
http://thevillager.com/villager_388/statedoh.html (reporting that “since the 
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DOH, along with other creditors, supplied St. Vincent’s Network 
with a $6 million capital infusion to ensure continued 
operations.214  NY DOH did not want St. Vincent’s Hospital to 
close, but simply could not continue making capital contributions 
to keep it financially afloat.215  NY DOH was also a part of the 
Governor’s appointed “task force” to help St. Vincent’s Hospital 
assess its options for a transfer of ownership, partnership, or 
sponsorship with another healthcare entity, and met almost daily 
with other members of the task force to assess the hospital’s 
restructuring plan.216  When it was evident that such transfer of 
ownership, partnership, or sponsorship was not practical, NY 
DOH was actively involved in implementing the closure plan 
throughout the bankruptcy.217  During the bankruptcy, NY DOH 
was proactive in working with potential purchasers or St. 
Vincent’s Network’s assets in either issuing emergency licenses 
and certificates of need, or reviewing applications for same on an 
expedited basis, so that the public need for such services would 
not be sacrificed.218 
NY DOH’s active involvement advanced the goals of 
insolvency and state regulation.  On one hand, NY DOH, in 
granting emergency certificates of need or other licenses, made a 
sale of St. Vincent’s Network’s assets more practical for the 
purchasers by expediting the licensing process.  By incentivizing 
the deal in this way, NY DOH assisted in liquidating St. Vincent’s 
Network’s assets and generating capital to return to its creditors.  
On the other hand, NY DOH was assuring that the public at large 
 
fall of 2008 the State Health Department had been meeting with the hospital 
leadership to help them restructure to become a viable business model”).   
 214. Toney Affidavit, supra note 157, at 27, ¶ 70; see also Motion to Close, 
supra note 155, at 7, ¶ 18. 
 215. State DOH Response on St. Vincent’s, supra note 213. Diane Mathis, 
Deputy Director of the Public Affairs Group of NY DOH, stated that the 
hospital needed $300 million to continue operations as a stand-alone facility, 
which was an amount “beyond the capability of the State as well as private 
investors.”  Id.  At the time, the state of New York was facing a $9.2 billion 
deficit. Id. Mathis also commented that “[t]he State Health Department did 
not advocate for, nor in any way support or encourage, the closure of St. 
Vincent’s.”  Id. 
 216. Toney Affidavit, supra note 156, at ¶ 72.   
 217. See id. ¶ 10. 
 218. See In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctr., 429 B.R. 139, 143 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. (2010); see also Motion to Sell Pax Christi, supra note 195, 
at 9, ¶ 22; Motion to Sell Behavioral Health Assets, supra note 204, at 20–21, 
¶¶ 46–47, at 32, ¶ 67.   
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was protected and ensured that services such as nursing homes 
and behavioral health programs remained in place and were 
available to the public at large. 
There is nothing easy about closing a non-profit hospital with 
a charitable mission.  However, while the closure of St. Vincent’s 
Hospital was a difficult and emotional decision, it was an easy 
financial one.  NY DOH’s involvement in St. Vincent’s Hospital’s 
closure yielded a result that served the public policy while also 
maximizing a return for creditors; an aspirational result for every 
insolvency proceeding. 
B. In re Saint Michael’s219 
 Founded in 1897 by the Franciscan Sisters of the Poor, Saint 
Michael’s Medical Center, Inc. (St. Michael’s) was a 357-bed 
hospital that provided tertiary-care to the Newark region of New 
Jersey.220  During 2012, St. Michael’s finances became hampered 
by disproportionately low Medicaid reimbursement rates, 
unsustainable debt levels, long-term and above-market lease 
obligations, and a reduction in inpatient daily revenue.221  
Accordingly, St. Michael’s “set out to find a solution to sustain the 
medical center’s mission and help it flourish both financially and 
clinically.”222  While St. Michael’s solicited a number of entities 
that expressed interest in purchasing St. Michael’s, Prime 
Healthcare Services-Saint Michael’s, LLC (Prime) appeared to be 
 
 219. In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., 15-24999 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 10, 
2015) https://cases.primeclerk.com/smmc/Home-Index. This case is still 
pending in Bankruptcy court as of this writing. 
 220. Verified Application in Support of the Debtors’ Motion for an Order 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 363 and 365 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002, 6004 and 
6006: (1) Approving “Stalking Horse” Asset Purchase Agreement for the Sale 
of Substantially all the Debtors’ Assets; (2) Approving Bidding Procedures, 
Including Certain Bid Protections, and Form, Manner and Sufficiency of 
Notice; (3) Scheduling (a) an Auction Sale and (b) a Hearing to Consider 
Approving the Highest and Best Offer; (4) Authorizing the Debtors to Sell 
Substantially all their Assets Free and Clear of Liens, Claims, 
Encumbrances, and Interests; (5) Authorizing the Debtors to Assume and 
Assign Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases; and (6) Granting 
Other Related Relief at 3, ¶ 6, In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., 15-24999 
(Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2015), ECF No. 17-1 [hereinafter Motion to Approve 
Stalking Horse Bid].  
 221. Declaration of David A. Ricci in Support of Debtors’ First Day 
Pleading at 10-11, ¶ 25, In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., 15-24999 
(Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2015), ECF No. 14 [hereinafter Ricci Affidavit].   
 222. Motion to Approve Stalking Horse Bid, supra note 220, at 4, ¶ 9.   
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the most “viable option to financially stabilize and secure a 
vibrant future” for St. Michael’s.223  On February 8, 2013, St. 
Michael’s and Prime entered into an asset purchase agreement 
and submitted the appropriate applications to the New Jersey 
Attorney General (NJ AG) and New Jersey Department of Health 
(NJ DOH) for the transfer of ownership for St. Michael’s.224 
Roughly a month later, Navigant Consulting Inc. 
(Navigant)—on behalf of New Jersey Healthcare Facilities 
Financing Authority—issued a report (the Navigant Report), 
recommending that the healthcare services in Newark be 
consolidated, and opining that Prime could not solve St. Michael’s 
economic plights.225  In response, St. Michael’s retained 
Honigman, Miller, Schwartz, and Cohn LLP to draft another 
report—the Honigman Report.226 The Honigman Report 
concluded that adoption of the Navigant Report recommendations 
would create an unregulated monopoly of healthcare services in 
Newark, which would result in higher costs to patients due to a 
decrease of competitiveness in the market.227  After submitting 
the appropriate applications, and the publication of the Navigant 
and Honigman Reports, St. Michael’s did not receive a decision 
from NJ DOH regarding the sale of St. Michael’s to Prime for over 
two years.228 
During the two-year wait, St. Michael’s financial status 
 
 223. Id. at 5, ¶ 10.   
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 5, ¶ 11.   
 226. See id. at 5, ¶ 12.  
 227. Id. (The Honigman Report estimated that if the Navigant Report 
recommendations were adopted, the community’s healthcare costs would 
increase by $180 million annually.).  
 228. Id. at 5, ¶ 10.  David Ricci, CEO of St. Michael’s stated that “[w]e’ve 
done everything the state has asked us to do . . . after two and a half years, it 
would appear we’re no further along than when we started.” Kathleen 
O’Brien, St. Michael’s Medical Center Files for Bankruptcy Protection, 
NJ.COM (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.nj.com/healthfit/index.ssf/2015/08/st_ 
michaels_medical_center_files_for_bankruptcy_pr.html. Ricci explained that 
“the hospital answered the state’s sixth round of questions regarding the sale 
in June and at this point have answered more than 400 questions, but have 
received no indications from the state as to when its application under the 
[certificate of need] process would be considered complete.” Andrew 
Kitchenman, With Bankruptcy Filing, Saint Michael’s Opens up New Front in 
Battle Over Sale, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.njspotlight.com/ 
stories/15/08/10/with-bankruptcy-filing-saint-michael-s-opens-up-new-front-
in-battle-over-sale/. 
2017] HEALTHCARE BANKRUPTCIES & RECEIVERSHIPS 185 
continued to deteriorate.229  For a six month period that ended on 
June 30, 2015, St. Michael’s produced $101.5 million in revenue 
and incurred $113 million in operating expenses, yielding a net 
operating loss of $11.5 million in six months.230  Before resorting 
to bankruptcy, St. Michael’s and Prime engaged in discussions 
with NJ DOH regarding a solution to Prime’s application; 
however, those discussions were unsuccessful.231  Due to the 
state’s inaction, the Navigant Report’s recommended 
consolidation, and St. Michael’s dismal financial performance, St. 
Michael’s “management and Board of Directors, along with their 
advisors, evaluated various restructuring options and determined 
that the best way to maximize [St. Michael’s] going concern value 
for the benefit of all stakeholders was to commence” a bankruptcy 
proceeding to force a sale under § 363 of the Code.232 
On August 10, 2015, St. Michael’s filed a voluntary petition 
for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 11 of the Code.233  
Contemporaneous with its petition for bankruptcy, St. Michael’s 
filed a motion to approve a “stalking horse” bid from Prime for a 
purchase of St. Michael’s assets, schedule an auction, and 
approving the highest and best offer, among other things.234  NJ 
DOH objected to St. Michael’s motion, stating that the motion 
presupposes NJ DOH’s approval of a hospital operating license 
and certificate of need for Prime.235  Specifically, “before the 
 
 229. See Ricci Affidavit, supra note, 221, at 9, ¶¶ 19–21.  NJ DOH justified 
its lengthy review with the following statement: “The department has taken a 
reasonable and deliberative approach as it always does with certificate of 
need applications. Having completed multiple rounds of questions, it remains 
under review.”  O’Brien, supra note, 228. 
 230. Ricci Affidavit, supra note 221, at 9, ¶ 21. 
 231. See id. at 12, ¶ 28.   
 232. Id. at 11, ¶ 27. The bankruptcy was also filed to relieve St. Michael’s 
from making a $1.8 million payment that was due to the New Jersey 
Healthcare Facilities Financing Authority. Susan K. Livio, N.J. Bankruptcy 
Judge Approves $62M St. Michael’s Hospital Sale, NJ.COM (Nov. 12, 2015), 
http://www.nj.com/healthfit/index.ssf/2015/11/nj_bankruptcy_judge_approves
_622m_st_michaels_purc.html.  
 233. Ricci Affidavit, supra note 221, at 3, ¶ 5.   
 234. See Motion to Approve Stalking Horse Bid, supra note 220, at 3–4, ¶ 
15.   
 235. Limited Objection of the New Jersey Department of Health to 
Debtors’ Motion for an Order (1) Approving “Staking Horse” Asset Purchase 
Agreement and (2) Approving Form, Manner and Sufficiency of Notice 
Bidding Procedures at 2, In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., 15-24999 
(Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2015), ECF No. 81 [hereinafter NJ DOH Objection].   
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ownership of a general acute care hospital can be transferred, the 
owner of the hospital must apply for and receive a [certificate of 
need] from the [NJ DOH] authorizing the transfer.”236 
Despite NJ DOH’s objection, the bankruptcy court approved 
the “stalking horse” bid, auction, and bidding procedures.237  On 
November 5, 2015, St. Michael’s conducted a sale auction at which 
sixteen bids were submitted by Prime and Prospect Saint 
Michael’s, Inc. (Prospect).238  Both Prime and Prospect presented 
their vision of the hospital and their credentials to St. Michael’s 
Board of Directors, which determined that Prime was the 
successful bidder.239  Prime and St. Michael’s executed a purchase 
agreement, in which Prime agreed to pay $62,247,750 (Purchase 
Price) for the purchase of St. Michael’s assets.240  Based upon the 
successful bidding of Prime, St. Michael’s filed a proposed sale 
order with the bankruptcy court, which was subsequently granted 
on November 13, 2015.241  However, at the time of the order 
granting the sale, NJ DOH had still not made a determination on 
Prime’s application for a certificate of need.242  Months after the 
 
 236. Id. at 4.   
 237. See Motion to Approve Stalking Horse Bid, supra note 220, at 2–3, ¶ 
5.   
 238. Declaration of Thomas Buck in Support of Debtors’ Motion for Entry 
of an Order Authorizing the Debtor to (A) Sell Substantially All of their 
Assets Free and Clear of Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, and Interest and (B) 
Assume and Assign Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases ¶ 8, 
In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., 15-24999 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2015), 
ECF No. 369 [hereinafter Buck Affidavit].   
 239. Id. at 3, ¶ 9.   
 240. Id. at 4, ¶ 11.  The purchase price was subject to certain increases or 
decreases based upon Saint Michael’s working capital and cash equivalents 
at the time of the sale. Id. The Purchase Price was $500,000 more than 
Prospect’s bid and $13 million more than the stalking horse bid.  Transcript 
for approval of the auction sale before Honorable Vincent J. Papalia United 
States Bankruptcy Court Judge at 10, In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., 
15-24999 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2015), ECF No. 398 [hereinafter Transcript 
Before Papalia]. 
 241. See Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(A), 363 and 365 (1) 
Authorizing the Debtors to Sell Substantially All of their Assets Free and 
Clear of All Liens, Claims, Encumbrances and Interests; (2) Authorizing the 
Debtors to Assume and Assign Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired 
Leases; and (3) Granting Other Related Relief ¶ 4, In re Saint Michaels Med. 
Ctr., Inc. 15-24999 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2015), ECF No. 383.   
 242. See N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH, CN# 1304-07-01, CERTIFICATE OF NEED 
DEPARTMENT STAFF PROJECT SUMMARY, ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS, 
TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP (2015) at 9–11, http://web.doh.state.nj.us/apps2/ 
documents/bc/Staff%20Recommendations%20-%20Saint%20Mike’s%20(Final) 
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sale, in early February, 2016, the State Health Planning Board 
approved a recommendation243 by NJ DOH staff to approve a 
certificate of need for the transfer of ownership from St. Michael’s 
to Prime.244  The NJ DOH staff commented that it “believe[d] that 
the decision to transfer the ownership of St. Michael’s is in the 
best interest of the hospital’s patient base.  This transfer, the only 
option presented to [NJ DOH], would be the least disruptive to the 
area’s health care delivery system of all the possible options, at 
this time.”245  A month after the NJ DOH Staff Recommendation, 
the commissioner of NJ DOH and the NJ AG finally approved the 
transfer of the certificate of need.246  The acting commissioner of 
NJ DOH commented that she “agree[d] that the proposed transfer 
of ownership, as opposed to closure of St. Michael’s, will preserve 
appropriate access to healthcare services for the community, 
including the medically indigent and medically underserved 
population.”247 
In re Saint Michael’s illustrates the simple proposition that if 
state regulatory agencies are not involved with a distressed 
hospital pre- and post-petition for insolvency, an ultimate 
disposition of the hospital’s assets may be delayed by the state’s 
bureaucratic processes.248  Without understanding the urgency 
and exigency of the need to transfer ownership to Prime, NJ DOH 
did not act with the urgency, flexibility, or assistance as seen in In 
re Saint Vincent’s.  While it is NJ DOH’s prerogative to undertake 
a comprehensive and diligent review of a certificate of need 
application, if they had been involved on the “front end” of St. 
 
.pdf [hereinafter NJ DOH STAFF REPORT]. 
 243. See id. at 17–18.  The NJ DOH decided that although St. Michael’s 
had complied with state protocol and guidelines, and despite some 
misgivings, the transfer would be best for St. Michael’s and the community.  
Id. 
 244. Sale of Saint Michael’s Medical Center to Prime Healthcare Services 
Clears Major Hurdle, SAINT MICHAEL’S MEDICAL CENTER (Feb. 4, 2016), 
http://www.smmcnj.com/News/2016/February/Sale-of-Saint-Michaels-Medi 
cal-Center-to-Prime-H.aspx. 
 245. NJ DOH STAFF REPORT, supra note 242, at 16.   
 246. See Susan K. Livio, N.J. Approves Sale of Bankrupt Newark Hospital, 
NJ.COM (Mar. 9, 2016, 11:14 PM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/ 
2016/03/state_approves_sale_of_bankrupt_newark_hospital.html.  
 247. Id.   
 248. See generally In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., 15-24999 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2015).  But see In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of 
N.Y., 10-11963 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010).  
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Michael’s financial problems, the transparency of the sale to 
Prime would have assisted in expediting NJ DOH’s decision 
process. 
C. A View from the Bench: A Judicial Perspective of the Westerly 
Hospital Special Master Proceeding249 
Westerly Hospital was a 125-bed healthcare facility, located 
in Westerly, Rhode Island, that had served Westerly and its 
surrounding communities for approximately ninety years.250  
Westerly Hospital and its related entities251 employed more than 
750 union and non-union individuals; had affiliations with more 
than 135 primary and specialty physicians; and provided primary 
and tertiary care, including interventional cardiology, obstetrics 
and gynecology, wound care, and general surgery.252  However, in 
2011, with patient revenue of $87.8 million and uncompensated 
care totaling $8.3 million, Westerly Hospital operated at a loss, for 
the fifth consecutive year, of more than $5.7 million and could not 
pay its bills as they became due.253  After failed attempts to find 
an economically beneficial transfer, partnership or sponsorship, 
Westerly Hospital’s Board of Directors authorized the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) to enter insolvency proceedings.254  On 
December 7, 2011, the CEO filed a Petition for the Appointment of 
a Special Master255 (Petition), with the statutory powers of a 
receiver, for Westerly Hospital and its related entities256 on the 
Business Calendar of the Rhode Island Superior Court. 257 
 
 249. See Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, Inc., No. 2011-0781, 2011 
WL 6296898 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011).  Many of the following facts are 
garnered from public record, but others are from the observations and 
experiences of Judge Brian P. Stern, who presided over the matter.  
 250. Id. at *1.  
 251. The related entities at the time of the Petition, were comprised of 
both not-for and for-profit entities, including Westerly Hospital Health Care, 
Inc., Atlantic Medical Group, Inc., Ocean Myst MSO, LLC, Women’s Health 
of Westerly, LLC, and North Stonington Health Center, Inc.  Id. at *1.  
 252. Id. at *2.  
 253. Id. at *1.   
 254. Id.   
 255. The appointment of a Special Master is permitted by Rule 53 of the 
Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.  See R.I. Super. Ct. R. 
Civ. P. 53.  Pursuant to subsection (c) of Rule 53, a court may limit or expand 
a Special Master’s powers as it deems appropriate.  See id.   
 256. Id.  
 257. Administrative Order No. 2011-10 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2011), https:// 
www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SuperiorCourt/DecisionsOrders/AdministrativeOrd
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In order to avoid closure, and in an effort to continue to 
provide low-cost, high-quality healthcare to its patients, the CEO 
requested that the court appoint a fiduciary Special Master, with 
the powers of a Receiver, to manage the day-to-day operations and 
take charge of Westerly Hospital’s assets.258  In addition, the 
Petition requested that the Special Master be authorized to review 
and make recommendations to the court, including but not limited 
to a sale of Westerly Hospital, a reorganization of Westerly 
Hospital’s debts, or a closure.259  After notice and hearing, the 
court appointed attorney W. Mark Russo as a Temporary Special 
Master and authorized the firms of Ferrucci Russo, P.C. and 
Adler, Pollack and Sheehan, P.C. to act as legal counsel to the 
Special Master.260 
It was clear to the court that from the time of the filing of the 
Petition that Westerly Hospital’s insolvency proceeding involved 
an array of complicated issues and a wide variety of stakeholders, 
including medical providers, patients, insurers, secured and 
unsecured creditors, employees, unions, and retirement plans.261  
It was also evident to the court that a major and critical 
participant in the proceeding would be state departments and 
agencies as the continued operation and disposition of the estate 
was inextricably tied to state licensing statutes, regulatory 
requirements, and the statutes governing the transfer or disposal 
of the assets of hospitals.262 
The court found that in order for the Special Master to have 
the greatest likelihood of success, the Special Master needed to 
have formal and informal means of communication with the 
state’s agencies and regulators from the earliest point possible in 
the insolvency proceeding.263  The court, mindful of the inherent 
conflicts between the goals of the insolvency process and the state 
statutory and regulatory process, as well as the significant 
amendments made by the BAPCPA with respect to healthcare 
 
ers/2011-10.pdf.  
 258. Kinney, 2011 WL 6296898, at *1.   
 259. See Petition for the Appointment of a Special Master at ¶ 9(a), 
Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, Inc., No. 2011-0781, 2011 WL 6296898 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011). 
 260. Kinney, 2011 WL 6296898, at *2–3. 
 261. See id. at *2, *4–5.  
 262. See id. at *2, *4.  
 263. See id. at *4.  
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entities, determined that these issues needed to be addressed from 
the inception of the proceeding to reduce the possibility that these 
conflicts would become an impediment to a successful resolution of 
the insolvency proceeding.264  Specifically, a disagreement or a 
“turf battle” between the Special Master and regulators over 
matters that could be resolved or avoided through early 
communication would benefit neither the insolvency estate nor 
would it be in the best interest of the state regulators.  Only 
through open and timely communication between the Special 
Master and the state regulators could material issues be identified 
so that the hospital could have the ability to find a pathway that 
would satisfy the goals of both the estate and the regulators. 
The court determined that Westerly Hospital’s distressed 
state and its special master proceeding “raise[d] significant public 
health, regulatory and public protection issues.”265  The court 
found that a formal and informal mechanism for the Special 
Master266 to share information and receive feedback from these 
regulatory, public health, and public protection agencies was 
critical to address these issues and provide for an efficient and 
successful outcome.267 Accordingly, the court appointed a 
voluntary268 Standing Regulatory and Public Protection 
Committee (Committee).269  The Committee was comprised of key 
 
 264. See id.   
 265. Id.  
 266. Depending upon the type of insolvency proceeding, the sharing of 
information may be between the state regulators and agencies and the debtor 
in possession, trustee, receiver, assignee, or special master.   
 267. While any regulated entity within or outside of an insolvency 
proceeding will have responsibilities to act in accordance with state statutes 
and regulations, as well as compliance and reporting requirements, this 
procedure allows the insolvent entity, under court supervision, to share 
information and discuss potential options with state regulators within a fluid 
insolvency proceeding. 
 268. The Committee was voluntary.  The court stated in an order that 
participation in the Committee was in no way intended to affect the rights 
and duties of each member, and that participation is advisory only, and 
specifically intended not to have any effect on any independent statutory, 
licensing, regulatory or public protection authority of these agencies or 
officials under federal or state law.  This portion of the Order was based upon 
input from these agencies and/or officials because it was important that their 
voluntary participation not be viewed as consenting to the jurisdiction of the 
Court, or being estopped from exercising its authority under statutes or 
regulations, based upon their participation. 
 269. While the Bankruptcy Code does not provide for the Committee for 
this purpose, an ad hoc or related group may be formed for this purpose. 
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regulators involved in the process, including the Rhode Island 
Secretary of Health and Human Services; the Director of the 
Rhode Island Department of Health; the Director of the 
Department of Administration; the Rhode Island Attorney 
General; the Rhode Island Health Insurance Commissioner; and 
the Lieutenant Governor of the State of Rhode Island, in her 
capacity as the Chairperson of the Healthcare Reform 
Commission.270  The court required that the Special Master work 
diligently with the Committee when taking actions during the 
course of the proceeding that impacted public health, regulatory, 
and public protection matters.271 
The initial meeting of the Committee was scheduled by the 
court shortly after the Petitions initial filing and was intended to 
bring these stakeholders up to date on the status of the special 
master proceeding.272  Topics discussed by the Special Master at 
the initial meeting included operational and financial issues such 
as: (1) the status of Westerly Hospital’s licenses and permits; (2) 
changes to the Board of Directors and Management; (3) 
employment and union issues; (4) communications with the public 
regarding the proceeding; (5) the ongoing provision of services by 
Westerly Hospital; (6) the maintenance of medical records, patient 
confidentiality, and the appointment of a Patient Care 
Ombudsman; (7) the hospital’s financial situation; and (8) the 
sharing of timely information with the Committee. 273 
During the course of the proceeding, there were a number of 
specific issues that were addressed by the Committee, including 
establishing a Patient Care Ombudsman, developing RFPs, 
payments of hospital fees, operation of the hospital prior to 
closing, and support in navigating and meeting the requirements 
of the Hospital Conversion Act. 
 
 270. Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, Inc., No. 2011-0781, 2011 WL 
6296898, at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011).   
 271. Id.   
 272. While some regulators were consulted in advance of the Petition, 
others were not.  It became apparent that these stakeholders should have 
been notified and briefed, in detail, prior to the filing. 
 273. Issues, such as investigations into licenses, including physicians and 
Medicaid issues, were addressed with the individual Committee members in 
their official regulatory capacity. 
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1. The Patient Care Ombudsman 
In order to assure that that quality patient care was provided 
and medical issues were addressed during the proceeding, the 
court ordered that a Patient Care Ombudsman be appointed and 
funded by the estate.274  The Special Master provided information 
to the Committee about the type of individual and experience it 
sought as it went through the search for the appropriate candidate 
and provided the Committee, in advance of seeking approval from 
the court, with the experience and scope of work regarding the 
candidate selected.  After receiving no further input from the 
Committee, a petition was filed and approved by the court for the 
retention of the Patient Care Ombudsman.275  The Ombudsman 
was highly qualified and well respected by the regulators and the 
medical community and ultimately provided necessary services at 
a reasonable cost to assure that the appropriate level of quality of 
care was being maintained during the special master 
proceeding.  The use of a Patient Care Ombudsman, while not 
required under state law, provided an important safeguard during 
the insolvency proceeding.  By appointing an Ombudsman that 
was supported by the Special Master, as well as the regulators, it 
allowed all parties to more fully concentrate on important 
decisions about the future of the hospital. 
2. The Development of the Request for Proposals 
After the Special Master conducted an extensive review, he 
suggested that a RFP should be issued to help to determine the 
disposition of the hospital and its assets.276  While a Special 
 
 274. Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, Inc., No. 2011-0781, 2011 WL 
629689, at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011).  “The concept of a Patient Care 
Ombudsman is taken from the Federal Bankruptcy Code. Section 333(a)(1) of 
the Bankruptcy Code requires that ‘[i]f the debtor in a case under Chapter 7, 
9 or 11 is a health care business, the court shall order . . . the appointment of 
an ombudsman to monitor the quality of patient care and to represent the 
interests of the patients of a health care business.’”  Kinney, 2011 WL 
6296898 at *4 n.2 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1)).  “[T]he appointment of an 
ombudsman [is] to monitor the quality of patient care and to represent the 
interests of the patients of the health-care business.”  Id. (citing AM. JUR. 
Bankruptcy § 696). 
 275. Order Petition for Instruction, Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, 
Inc., No. 2011-0781 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2012). 
 276. Order Entered, Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, Inc., No. 2011-
0781 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2012). 
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Master may, through a court-approved process, solicit proposals, 
any successful bidder of a hospital is required to proceed 
independently through the state’s regulatory and licensing 
process.  To ensure that any bidder successfully navigated through 
the regulatory and licensing process, the Special Master requested 
input from the Committee about the information that should be 
requested in the RFP that would assist in the review of the 
proposals.  Through this process, the RFP documents were 
extensively modified to include information about the bidder’s 
ability to meet certain requirements under the regulatory 
statutes, which dramatically assisted the Special Master in 
making a recommendation to the court regarding the best value to 
the estate and its creditors.277 The responses to the RFP also 
provided the regulators with specific information about the 
bidders, which may not have been available otherwise prior to the 
formal application process. 
In addition to formulating the questions in the RFP, another 
significant challenge was the inclusion of a stalking horse bidder 
as part of the RFP process.278  The Special Master concluded that 
in order to achieve the highest and best offer a stalking horse 
bidder should be allowed, as a part of the solicitation process.279  
The purpose of the stalking horse was to set the floor for bidding 
and to indicate to prospective bidders that there was at least one 
other qualified bidder ready, willing and able to acquire the 
hospital.280 The agreement with the stalking horse bidder 
included a requirement of a breakup fee, upon approval by the 
court, should another bidder be successful.281  The use of a 
stalking horse bid was a foreign concept to the Committee, which 
had a number of concerns, including: (1) allowing a bidder to be 
designated a stalking horse without filing an application or 
receiving formal approval from the regulators; (2) that a stalking 
 
 277. See Order at 2–4, Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, Inc., No. 
2011-0781 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2012). 
 278. Special Master’s Petition for Instructions Regarding the Presentation 
and Acceptance of a Stalking Horse Offer at 5–6, Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. 
Healthcare, Inc., No. 2011-0781 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 30, 2012). 
 279. Id. at 6. 
 280. Id.  
 281. Id. at 5; see also Special Master’s Emergency Petition For 
Instructions Authorizing the Special Master to Bring a Stalking Horse Bid 
Before the Court for Consideration at 2, Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. 
Healthcare, Inc., No. 2011-0781 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 23, 2012). 
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horse bid may give an unfair advantage to one bidder over others, 
as that bidder would have the ability to negotiate a purchase 
agreement and material terms of the transaction; and (3) that a 
breakup fee may have to be paid to the stalking horse bidder, even 
if they did not ultimately acquire the hospital.  However, the 
Special Master eased the Committee’s concerns by providing it 
with information about the advantages and disadvantages of the 
stalking horse process and how these transactions have been 
effectuated in other jurisdictions, and because of the working 
relationship that had been built between the Special Master and 
the Committee, this process was brought before the court by 
Petition and approved without objections by the regulators.  As a 
result of the sharing of information and communication between 
the Special Master and the Committee, a more efficient and 
effective RFP process took place. 
3. Payment of Hospital Licensing Fees 
A significant financial issue that arose during the insolvency 
proceeding was the unpaid licensing fees owed to the State, both 
pre- and post-filing.  Due to Westerly Hospital’s cash flow issues, 
the Special Master maintained that the hospital could not satisfy 
its outstanding licensing fee payments when they became due, 
which totaled almost $4 million each year.  The State argued that 
that if the licensing fees were not paid in full that it had the power 
and authority to revoke or suspend the hospital’s operating 
license.  Despite the number of legal arguments that both the 
Special Master and the State could have raised, through robust 
communication, the State and the Special Master were able to 
come to an agreement allowing the hospital to pay the licensing 
fees over a period of time, including payment of a portion of those 
fees by the acquirer after closing.  The State, by its involvement in 
the Committee, recognized the Special Master’s cash flow issues 
and the Special Master recognized the licensing fees and the 
relationship to the charitable care payments made to the hospital 
during the same periods.  A very expensive and uncertain conflict 
was avoided through communication between the Committee and 
the Special Master, allowing the estate to concentrate on the 
operation of the hospital and disposition of its assets. 
4. Operating Agreement Prior to Closing 
Prior to closing the sale of the hospital with the successful 
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bidder and prior to the obtaining final approvals and licenses 
under the hospital conversion act and other statutes, the Special 
Master determined that it would be in the estate’s best interest to 
enter into an operating agreement, which would allow the 
successful bidder to assume the day-to-day management of the 
hospital under the authority of the Special Master.  This required 
an understanding and consent by the regulators that this 
arrangement would be permissible.  Although the licensing 
process had yet to be finalized, the regulators agreed, after 
conversations and communications with the Special Master and 
the successful bidder that it was in the best interest of all parties 
to permit the operating agreement to go forward. When the 
petition to authorize the operating agreement was filed with the 
court, it was approved by the court without objection. It is unclear 
whether such an operating agreement would have been permitted 
or possible without ongoing communication among the Special 
Master, the successful bidder, and the regulators throughout the 
process. 
5. Support During the Hospital Conversion Act Proceedings 
During the Hospital Conversion Act proceedings before the 
Department of Health and the Attorney General, there was 
information and answers to questions that the estate was in the 
best position to provide. With the lines of communication fully 
opened, often brief communication about issues that could have 
slowed down the process allowed it to proceed forward in a timely 
and efficient manner. 
The outcome of Westerly Hospital’s Special Master proceeding 
was extremely successful.  A critical hospital serving Rhode Island 
and a portion of Connecticut was sold and the sale received 
expedited approval by the Department of Health and the Attorney 
General.282 This outcome was the opposite of the distinct 
possibility when the petition was filed that the hospital would 
close. Under the terms of the purchase, Lawrence and Memorial 
Hospital agreed to a total of $69 million in cash and other 
commitments, including the assumption of $22 million in debt, 
committing $6.5 million in working capital during the first two 
years, and investing $30 million in new technology, equipment 
 
 282. The certificate of need process was expedited in accordance with R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 23-15-5(a) (2014). 
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and expansion of services over the next five years. 
Overall the Committee process worked very well.  Members of 
the Committee had real-time information about the status of the 
insolvency proceeding that related to their areas of regulatory and 
statutory responsibility.  The Committee process fostered a degree 
of trust between the regulators and the Special Master, and when 
issues arose, rather than the regulators or the Special Master 
jumping to conclusions that there was a lack of candor or an issue 
could not be resolved, a discussion would take place.  Based on 
open and honest communication, numerous issues were resolved 
before they became major issues.  The creditors and prospective 
bidders also had a degree of comfort that the debtor and the 
regulators were not working at cross-purposes or that the 
insolvent estate would close and be liquidated because of the 
failure of communication or coordination. If one change could be 
made to the Committee concept it would be to have a structure in 
place prior to filing the Petition, when the hospital was in distress, 
in an attempt to “hit the ground running” upon the hospital filing 
for insolvency.  Arguably the formation and use of a Committee, in 
this case, resulted in secured creditors that were more comfortable 
allowing their collateral to be used during the insolvency process 
and provided additional comfort to potential purchasers, 
ultimately obtaining a higher value for the assets of the Westerly 
Hospital and related entities. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS ON REGULATOR INVOLVEMENT 
As seen above, when a hospital faces insolvency, the conflict 
between maximizing recovery for creditors and complying with 
state regulation can be reconciled;283 however, such reconciliation 
can only be accomplished when regulators are “brought to the 
table” and are actively involved prior to and during the insolvency 
proceeding. If regulators are not considered, consulted, or 
involved, the disposition of the hospital’s assets, or its transfer of 
ownership, may become a difficult and lengthy process, resulting 
in higher costs and less return to the insolvent estate.284  There 
are several ways regulators can be involved in the affairs of a 
distressed hospital:  (1) states can establish an emergency hospital 
 
 283. See In re United Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 97-1159, 1997 WL 176574, 
at *10 (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 26, 1997). 
 284. See id. 
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and healthcare working groups made up of relevant state 
regulatory agencies that identify and consult distressed hospitals 
within or entering insolvency; (2) state regulatory agencies can 
create ad hoc regulatory and public protection committees during 
the insolvency proceeding; and (3) state regulatory agencies can 
participate in mediation during bankruptcy proceedings. 
A. Establish an Emergency Hospital and Healthcare Working 
Group 
Each state should establish a Working Group to address 
healthcare institutions that are in distress or that have or may file 
for insolvency.285  The Working Group should consist of 
representation from each licensing and public protection 
organization that regulates the healthcare institutions in the 
state.  The purpose of formation of a regulatory Working Group is 
to facilitate communication and coordinate the sharing of all 
material information concerning the distressed hospital between 
regulatory agencies. 
To be effective, at its inception, the Working Group should 
establish operating guidelines and procedures.  Such operating 
guidelines may be memorialized in a memorandum of 
understanding or similar interagency agreement. Several 
governing policies and procedures that should be considered 
include:  (1) the authority and limits of the Working Group, 
including maintaining the independence and statutory authority 
of each individual regulatory member; (2) the appointment of one 
department or agency that will be responsible for the 
administrative operations of the Working Group, including 
identifying the committee membership and maintaining up to date 
contact information for each members representative; (3) the 
process for activating the committee; (4) the protocol for the 
Working Group Chair to act as a liaison to assure that all 
members have the latest, most accurate information; (5) if the 
committee is a public body under law, assure that all public 
records and public meeting requirements are complied with; (6) 
 
 285. Depending on the type of governmental entity, the Working Group 
can be formed through methods, including, statute, ordinance, regulation or 
Executive Order.  Some states have already authorized such working groups.  
See Governor Jon S. Corzine, Executive Order No. 39 (Oct. 12, 2006), 
http://nj.gov/infobank/circular/eojsc39.htm.  
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coordinate reporting, where appropriate, to senior government 
policy makers that have an interest in the healthcare institution; 
and (7) recognize that many healthcare institutions conduct 
business in other states, counties or jurisdictions, and that there 
needs to be a procedure for the Working Group to coordinate and 
communicate, where possible, with the Working Groups 
established in other jurisdictions.  Working Group members 
should be trained in these operating procedures, in advance, so if 
and when a qualifying event arises the Working Group can be 
activated and begin its tasks immediately. 
As aforementioned, during the normal operation of a 
healthcare institution and during an insolvency proceeding the 
healthcare institution is required to maintain compliance with 
state statutes, regulations, and policies implemented and enforced 
by a variety of agencies and departments.286  These different 
functions are generally distributed among a number of agencies 
and departments that have expertise in various areas.287  A 
healthcare institution is required to deal with a variety of 
departments, agencies, or commissions on an individual basis 
during its normal operations.  However, during a period where a 
healthcare institution faces insolvency, it is important that 
regulatory and statutory compliance are administered in a more 
coordinated and holistic manner.  This is because, during a period 
of distress, there is an increased risk of material change within 
the hospital, such as a change of control, increase or decrease in 
the lines of services offered, requests for purchase or sale of 
 
 286. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 959(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).   
 287. For instance, the State’s Department of Health generally handles 
licensing and certificate of needs; the Office of the Health Insurance 
Commissioner generally handles private insurance contracts; the 
Department of Human Services generally handles Medicaid reimbursement; 
the Department of Labor generally handles employment and safety issues; 
and the Department of the Attorney General generally handles public 
protection issues, not-for-profit issues, and transfer of health care license 
under hospital conversion acts.  See What we License, R.I. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
http://health.ri.gov/licenses/index.php (last visited Sept. 5, 2016); Laws, 
Regulations, and Orders, R.I. OFF. OF THE HEALTH INS. COMMISSIONER, 
http://www.ohic.ri.gov/ohic-regulation.php (last visited Sept. 5, 2016); 
Workforce Regulation and Safety, R.I. DEP’T OF LAB. & TRAINING, 
http://www.dlt.ri.gov/wrs/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2016); Medicaid Programs, R.I. 
DEP’T OF HUM. SERVS., http://www.dhs.ri.gov/Programs/index.php (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2016); Office of the Health Care Advocate, R.I. DEP’T OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL, http://www.riag.ri.gov/CivilDivision/OfficeoftheHealthCareAdvoca 
te.php (last visited Sept. 5, 2016). 
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capital assets, or the sale or closure of the healthcare facility, all of 
which involve different regulatory agencies.  Accordingly, in such 
scenarios it is appropriate for the Working Group be activated to 
share information, have real time structured interagency 
communication, address issues, and coordinate among regulatory 
departments to the extent possible.  A proactive approach is a 
better course of action than the licensing and public protection 
authorities being faced with an emergency that has festered, 
without communication and coordination.  Without such 
involvement, a State and a hospital may be left with a “Hobson’s 
choice”: either the healthcare institution closes immediately or it 
will require an immediate capital contribution from the state to 
remain open or have an orderly wind down of operations.288  
When dealing with healthcare entities that impact the public 
health, safety, and welfare of citizens, it is critical that all 
government entities that have an interest in the healthcare 
institution have an avenue to timely receive and process all 
material information so that deliberate and informed decisions 
can be made. 
The concept of an emergency committee or operations center 
already exists in most jurisdictions to address certain public 
health and safety emergencies.  The Emergency Operations 
Center, generally under the auspices of the Emergency 
Management Agency, have the statutory and/or executive 
authority to bring together departments and agencies in a central 
location to provide interagency coordination in support of a 
regional incident and local response.289  These emergencies 
generally include such events as snowstorms, hurricanes, flooding, 
power failures, mass casualty incidents, and other public safety 
emergencies.290 The Emergency Operations Center brings 
together the parties for a particular incident necessary to address 
the emergency.291 The parties may include government 
 
 288. “Hobson’s Choice” is “the necessity of accepting one of two or more 
equally objectionable alternatives.” Hobson’s Choice, MERRIAM WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Hobson’s% 
20choice (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (second full definition).   
 289. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39A.050(1), (2)(d) (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
 290. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39A.010 (West, Westlaw through 2016 
Reg. Sess.). 
 291. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39A.050(2)(d) (West, Westlaw through 
2016 Reg. Sess.). 
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departments, agencies, law enforcement, utilities and provide a 
structured vehicle to receive information, make recommendations, 
and for policy makers to coordinate a response.292 
This type of communication and coordination that exists in 
the Emergency Operation Center may work well in a potential 
healthcare insolvency matter.  There are a variety of regulatory 
and public protection departments, agencies, commissions, and 
subgroups therein that have an interest in the regulation, 
licensing, and oversight of healthcare institutions.  All of these 
governmental institutions should be identified for inclusion in the 
Working Group.  Other governmental departments and agencies 
may also be considered for inclusion in the Working Group, such 
as a representative from the budget/finance department, taxation 
department, and governmental bonding authority.293 
B. Establish an Ad Hoc Regulatory and Public Protection 
Committee 
In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, parties can be a part 
of official committees, which are “designed to foster the 
development of consensual Chapter [11] plans of 
reorganization.”294  A principal task of an official committee is to 
“directly participate in crafting the debtor’s plan” of 
reorganization.295  Members of official committees generally owe 
fiduciary duties to the remainder of the committee; individual 
members may not use their positions to advance their own 
interests at the expense of other members.296  These official 
committees are granted statutory powers, including the right to 
consult with the debtor; the right to retain professionals, paid for 
by the debtor; and standing to be heard by the bankruptcy 
 
 292. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39A.0502)(a), (c), (d) (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
 293. These non-regulatory, public-protection agencies may not have access 
to all non-public confidential information. This can be addressed in the 
Committee’s policies and procedures. 
 294. Henry C. Kevane, Jeffrey T. Kucera & Mathew J. Ochs, No more Ad 
Lib:  The Nuts & Bolts of Ad Hoc Bankruptcy Committees, BUS. L. TODAY 
(Dec. 2014), at 1, available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/ 
2014/12/02_kevane.html; see 11 U.S.C.A. § 1102(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. 
L. No. 114–244). 
 295. Kevane, et al., supra note 294, at 1. 
 296. Id. at 2; see also 11 U.S.C.A § 1103(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
114–244). 
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court.297 The official committee members also have a vote on any 
plan of reorganization and the committee may take an official 
position on proposed actions of the debtor in the bankruptcy 
proceeding.298  While participation on such a committee would 
seem to be an appropriate way to involve state regulatory 
agencies, the Code is clear that a governmental entity is not 
permitted to serve as a voting member of an Official Committee in 
a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.299  In fact, only a “person” may be on an 
official committee, and “government unit”300 is specifically 
excluded in the Code from the definition of the term “person.”301  
However, such exclusion from official committees should not 
dissuade regulatory agencies from forming an ad hoc committee.  
Rather, when it becomes likely that a healthcare institution may 
file or has filed for bankruptcy or state receivership, government 
regulatory agencies should consider participating in ad hoc 
regulatory and public protection committees within the insolvency 
proceeding. 
An ad hoc committee refers to “any group of stakeholders who 
wish to collaborate in the pursuit of similar claims or interests.”302  
Ad hoc committees are fundamentally different from official 
committees as they are “free from many of the constraints 
governing official committees.”303  “As a result, an ad hoc 
committee is able to organize itself in almost any way it sees fit, 
and may be as fluid or as organized as their members and 
interests require.”304 
 
 297. 11 U.S.C.A § 1103(a), (c)(1) (Westlaw). 
 298. Id. § 1103(c)(3). 
 299. See id. § 1102(b)(1) (“persons” can be a part of a committee); 11 
U.S.C.A. § 101(41) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244) (“The term 
‘person’ . . . does not include governmental unit”).  However, a government 
unit may be on an official committee if it is a creditor.  See id.   
 300. A “government unit” includes the “United States; State; 
Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, 
agency, or instrumentality of the United States (but not a United States 
trustee while serving as a trustee in a case under this title), a State, a 
Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or 
other foreign or domestic government.”  11 U.S.C.A. § 101(27) (Westlaw).   
 301. See 11 U.S.C.A §§ 101(41), 1102(b)(1) (Westlaw).  There is a dearth of 
legislative history documenting the rationale behind this decision to exclude 
governmental entities under Chapter 11 of the Code. 
 302. Kevane, et al., supra note 294. 
 303. Id.   
 304. Id. “While official committees are frequently administered in a 
formal, corporate style—adopting bylaws, subcommittees, chairpersons, and 
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An ad hoc committee is formed through the collective action of 
stakeholders.305  The committee may exist prior to or after a 
bankruptcy proceeding has been filed, and the members of the 
committee, subject to the agreement of the members, may join or 
withdraw from the committee at any time.306  Generally, the 
members of an ad hoc committee do not owe a fiduciary duty to 
the other members and do not automatically have collective 
standing or any greater powers than any other individual party in 
the bankruptcy case.307  Although the ad hoc committee does not 
have automatic statutory standing to be heard by the bankruptcy 
court, the committee collectively may achieve standing if they are 
a party with a practical stake in the outcome of the proceeding 
under § 1109(b) of the Code, which provides that “[a] party in 
interest . . . may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue 
in a case under this chapter.”308  Due to the informal status of the 
ad hoc committee, the debtor is also not required to disclose 
information to ad hoc committees.309  The expenses of the ad hoc 
committee are not generally reimbursed unless the committee can 
demonstrate that its efforts made a “substantial contribution” to 
the debtor’s estate and to creditors generally.310  Similarly, the ad 
hoc committee may retain professionals to assist it through the 
insolvency; however, the recovery of these “professional fees” may 
be questionably recoverable according to recent bankruptcy case 
law.311 
While the Code prohibits government entities from 
participating as voting members in the statutory creditors’ 
committees under Chapter 11 of the Code, one or more 
government entities should create ad hoc committees prior to and 
during the insolvency proceeding to establish an avenue of 
 
regular meetings—ad hoc committees are typically more informally 
managed.”  Id. 
 305. Id.   
 306. Id. Ad hoc committees are often formed prior to an insolvency filing 
in an attempt to reach a resolution that results in a prepackaged bankruptcy 
or receivership. 
 307. Id. 
 308. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1109(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244); Ad 
Hoc Bondholders Group v. Interco Inc., 141 B.R. 422, 424–25 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mo. 1992). 
 309. Kevane et al., supra note 294, at 2.   
 310. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b)(3)(D), (b)(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
114–244). 
 311. Kevane et al., supra note 294, at 4.  
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collaboration and communication. After the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005312 (BAPCPA), 
the participation of government entities is critical to the outcome 
of the bankruptcy case.  Whether the bankruptcy court is 
ultimately asked to approve a sale, plan of reorganization, a plan 
of adjustment or liquidation, the court can only approve these 
outcomes under bankruptcy law when there has been compliance 
with state law.  That makes the government regulator arguably as 
important, if not more important, than any other secured or 
unsecured creditors.  The government entity, in a very real sense, 
is the “elephant in the room,” and an ad hoc committee is the 
perfect avenue for state regulators to be heard and efficiently 
communicate and coordinate during an insolvency proceeding.  An 
ad hoc committee, similar to the Emergency Healthcare 
Coordinating Committee, allows the regulators and government 
entities to communicate and coordinate during the pendency of 
the insolvency.  The ad hoc committee has the ability to set up 
policies and procedures to address its own membership, 
confidentiality and the independence of individual regulatory and 
government agencies.  Such informal participation in an ad hoc 
committee will allow for collaboration, communication, and 
transparency among its members, including members from 
outside the jurisdiction, without the risk of compromising a 
regulatory agency’s own statutory responsibilities, obligations, 
and independence. The Committee may also act as a 
clearinghouse for information.313  The ad hoc committee, on a 
case-by-case basis, may also determine whether or not it is 
prudent to fund the committee and retain professionals to advise 
the committee on issues during the insolvency proceeding, rather 
than separate departments and agencies retaining their own 
professionals and consultants. 
Debtors, creditors, and other interested parties have used the 
ad hoc committee process effectively for many years in insolvency 
 
 312. Pub. L. No. 109–8A, 119 Stat. 23–217.  A number of bankruptcy 
courts found, prior to the BAPCPA amendments, that state regulation in the 
health care area could be avoided in certain circumstances under § 105 of the 
Code. 
 313. One issue that arises in state regulation that is not as prevalent in 
federal regulation is the differing requirements for notice under the 
Bankruptcy Code.  Through a committee, the debtor can be provided with 
detailed information about the government entities that require notice. 
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proceedings.314  It is appropriate and necessary for government 
entities to begin to use this available tool prior to and during an 
insolvency proceeding.  This is especially important during a time 
when the government entity has a large effect on the outcome of 
the insolvency proceeding.  A government regulatory ad hoc 
committee has proven to be efficient and effective in practice.  
During Westerly Hospital’s receivership, the court created a 
voluntary ad hoc “Regulatory and Public Protection Committee” so 
that “the regulatory and public protection agencies have access to 
timely information about the Westerly Hospital and Related 
Entities.”315  The Regulatory and Public Protection Committee 
was integral to the receivership, and worked closely with the 
Special Master during Westerly Hospital’s transfer of 
ownership.316 
C. Consider Participation in Mediation During the Insolvency 
In many insolvency proceedings there are obstacles to 
reaching an effective and efficient outcome that satisfies both the 
government entities licensing and public protection 
responsibilities and achieves the highest and best return to 
creditors.  Mediation may be a valuable resource for working 
through these obstacles, as it can coordinate the process, timing, 
and sharing of information.317  Mediation is “a process in which a 
mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between 
parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement 
regarding their dispute.”318  Mediation allows the parties to retain 
control over both the method of dispute resolution as well as the 
outcome, which is voluntary.  It provides a forum where one party 
can attempt to understand another party’s position and attempt to 
 
 314. Kevane et al., supra note 294, at 1.   
 315. Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, Inc., No. 2011-0781, 2011 WL 
6296898, at *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011).   
 316. See discussion regarding Westerly Hospital supra Part IV.C. 
 317. See Order Assigning Matter to Mediation, In re Interfaith Med. Ctr., 
Inc., No. 12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013), ECF No. 797. 
 318. Nancy A. Welsh, You’ve Got Your Mother’s Laugh:  What Bankruptcy 
Mediation Can Learn from the Her/History of Divorce and Child Custody 
Mediation, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 427, 432 (2009); see also James M. 
Peck & Erica J. Richards, Bankruptcy Mediation: Case Studies, 
Considerations and Conclusions, INT’L COMP. LEGAL GUIDE TO CORP. 
RECOVERY & INSOLVENCY 16 (8th ed. 2014), https://media2.mofo.com/ 
documents/140701bankruptcymediationcasestudies.pdf. 
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craft a solution that is mutually beneficial.  Through 
confidentiality and “no-use” agreements, the parties can share 
material information in an attempt to reach consensus without 
fear that disclosures will be used later in an adversary 
proceeding.319  The mediator, who has expertise in the field, can 
facilitate a resolution as an “honest broker.”  When successful, 
mediation in bankruptcy has certain “well-recognized advantages 
over traditional litigation, including reduced costs and increased 
predictability of outcomes, a reduction in the length of bankruptcy 
proceedings, the removal of sensitive or undecided issues from the 
court’s discretion, the elimination of the potential for appeal, and 
the maintenance of confidentiality.”320 
Mediation was first used in bankruptcy courts in 1986, and by 
1990 bankruptcy courts began using mediation on an ad hoc 
basis.321  “One of the most significant uses of mediation in the 
bankruptcy context is the inclusion of the process in Chapter 11 
reorganization plans, in order to resolve claims that do not come 
within the limited jurisdiction of bankruptcy procedures.”322  
Accordingly, mediation continues to be a tool utilized by many 
bankruptcy courts today.323 
Government entities have participated, to a limited extent, in 
the mediation process.324  To be a viable alternative for the 
government entity, it is critical that their independent statutory 
and regulatory authority be acknowledged and respected.  It is 
also critical that an appropriate mediator is selected who has 
expertise in both state healthcare regulation and public 
protection, as well as the insolvency field.  Further, it is important 
that the mediator can navigate the areas where mediation would 
be beneficial and the areas that are not proper for inclusion in 
mediation.  The initial response of some state regulators and 
public protection officials will be to reject the idea of mediation, as 
it will somehow limit the ability of the regulator to exercise its full 
 
 319. Peck & Richards, supra note 318, at 19.  “One workaround that has 
been used in a number of cases is the entry of a protective comfort order 
entered in advance of, and as a condition to, plan negotiations, providing that 
participants will be protected from specified future claims.”  Id.   
 320. Id.  
 321. Welsh, supra note 318, at 441.   
 322. Id. at 444. 
 323. See Peck & Richards, supra note 318, at 16–19.   
 324. See Order Assigning Matter to Mediation, In re Interfaith Med. Ctr., 
Inc., No. 12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013), ECF No. 797. 
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statutory or regulatory authority.325  For example, in In re 
Interfaith, the Interfaith Hospital strongly believed that NY DOH 
“ha[d] to be a participant” in the mediation, but the NY DOH 
believed that its participation would compromise its role as a 
regulator.326  NY DOH explained “DOH is a regulator and would 
have to make decisions under state law if there’s a transfer of the 
ownership certificates.  And they can’t be involved” in 
preliminarily approving or denying bidders merely based on 
qualifications.327  The bankruptcy court explained that NY DOH, 
because it was ultimately charged with the approval of the 
transfer license and certificates of need, was an important and 
critical voice to be heard in mediation; therefore, without NY 
DOH’s participation in mediation, the mediation would be 
“pointless.”328  NY DOH rebutted that it “can certainly provide 
input if the debtor chooses a plan, but as to competing plans, it’s 
not something that [it] [could] be involved in.”329  With that 
clarification, and with assurances that the mediation would be 
confidential and nonbinding, NY DOH agreed to participate in 
mediation in a limited role.330 
In some instances, the debtor and other creditors may also be 
hesitant about participating in a mediation process with the state 
regulators and public protection officials.  One reason being that 
the government entity may not just be a regulatory authority, but, 
in some cases, it may also be a significant creditor in the 
insolvency proceedings.  A debtor may be concerned that even 
though the government entity is not permitted to use the “police 
power” exception to the automatic stay to recover pre-petition 
debts, the government entity will use the issues being discussed in 
the mediation as leverage to have its pre-petition claims paid.  
Additionally, a debtor may be concerned that in dealing with a 
regulatory agency in a healthcare insolvency matter, there often 
exist political issues.  For instance, does the government entity 
want a certain predetermined result for political reasons such as 
the closure of the healthcare institution or an increase or decrease 
 
 325. See Transcript of Hearing at 160–61, In re Interfaith Med. Ctr., Inc., 
No. 12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2013), ECF No. 801.   
 326. Id. at 161. 
 327. Id. at 160.   
 328. Id. at 162. 
 329. Id.  
 330. Id. at 164.   
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in services?  A political preference or opposition to a for-profit 
healthcare entity acquiring the healthcare entity?  The debtor and 
other creditors may see these issues as a reason that the 
mediation will not result in progress, and so is not appropriate to 
dedicate the time, expense, and the resulting delay in the overall 
case that it may cause. 
However, with the regulator and debtor’s concerns in mind, it 
is important to remember that the purpose of the mediation with a 
government entity is the coordination and sharing of information; 
it is not a forum for final statutory decision-making.  It is merely 
an impetus to open the lines of communication between state 
regulators and the healthcare debtor.  The mediation may very 
well assist all parties to plan and reconcile two sometimes 
incongruous systems that have different goals, timelines, and 
public policy rationales.  It is in the public interest for the 
government entity to discuss and coordinate, where possible, to 
reach a process and outcome that is in the public interest.  While 
protecting the exercise of the regulators authority under state law 
is appropriate, this can still be accomplished while participating 
in mediation.  In fact, affecting or curtailing the statutory or 
regulatory authority of governmental entities should never be the 
subject of mediation. 
These perspectives from the regulators, debtors, and creditors 
are important considerations demonstrate that the use of 
mediation may lead to a more effective and efficient outcome.  A 
well-chosen mediator, with expertise in both areas of the law, will 
be able to direct the mediation to areas where all parties can agree 
and have a common interest.  The mediator may also assist in 
putting in place a schedule that accommodates the regulator’s 
statutory issues, the debtor’s issues continuing to operate the 
institution, and the creditor’s concerns that its collateral will 
continue to decline in value while in use.  The potential progress 
of the mediation process likely outweighs the delay and cost of the 
mediation proceeding.  As a result, mediation should be seriously 
considered in the appropriate situations. 
CONCLUSION 
Healthcare insolvencies present a unique dilemma in which 
the goal of achieving the “highest and best” return for creditors 
may be frustrated by a state’s explicit authority to control the 
public health.  However, the cases discussed herein are 
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illustrative that this conflict can be ameliorated when state 
regulators are actively involved in the insolvency from the earliest 
point.  While there are no formal procedures to force regulator 
involvement, several more informal means can accomplish the 
same goal.  First, states can implement a distressed hospital 
working group that is comprised of several regulatory authorities 
to address hospitals in distress.  Such a working group retains a 
regulator’s independent authority while also directing its 
attention to hospitals facing economic troubles.  Second, state 
regulators can form ad hoc committees as part of insolvency 
proceedings.  Because of the informal nature of the ad hoc 
committee, a state regulator can control the extent of its 
involvement while achieving transparency and garnering material 
information throughout the proceeding.  Further, so long as the 
regulatory committee is a substantial benefit to the bankrupt 
estate, it may be entitled to recover its costs as administrative 
expenses to the estate.  Last, regulators can participate in 
mediation.  Mediation is the ideal method of regulator 
involvement as long as it brings regulators “to the table” while at 
the same time protecting their independence and respecting their 
regulatory role.  No matter what method is used one principal 
proposition remains: regulator involvement in a healthcare 
insolvency is paramount.  Without involvement by state 
regulators, the sale, transfer, or disposition of a hospital’s assets 
to new ownership may be substantially delayed or postponed and 
cost the bankrupt estate additional capital and time.  Early and 
active regulator involvement serves to maximize recovery for 
creditors while ensuring public health is not sacrificed, an 
undeniably ideal outcome for any healthcare insolvency. 
 
